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Weapons of Mass Hysteria, Faulty 
Biothreat Predictions, and Their Impact on 
National (In)Security: 
A Case-Study of Smallpox 
or 
The Misuse of Mathematical Modeling to 
Project Biothreats, Terrorism Attacks, and 
Epidemics 
Barbara Pfeffer Billauer† 
“It is the beginning of scientific wisdom to recognize that not all 
questions have answers.”†† 
Abstract 
Biothreat projections for pandemic and bioterrorist planning are 
generated by a straight-forward computational system, rather than 
scientific evidence. The mathematical-modeling method typically uses 
three variables involved in disease transmission with values culled from 
assorted past epidemics, often assuming the absolute worst-case scenario. 
However, other important metrics, such as biological plausibility, relevant 
historical data, and modern medical practice, are often ignored. Past 
pandemic projections for avian flu, smallpox, anthrax, swine flu, and Ebola 
grotesquely overestimated the disease’s incidence and mortality 
illustrating deficiencies in current models, and in some cases, generating 
adverse health consequences more severe than any realistic epidemic. 
These catastrophic predictions generate fear and hysteria, thereby 
establish the predicate for maximum federal funding, impeding rational 
safeguards to our national security by inappropriately diverting resources 
from necessary, but less glamorous, quotidian public-health concerns. 
 
† While pursuing a PhD at the Faculty of Law of Haifa University, Barbara Pfeffer 
Billauer is a Research Professor at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C. 
She has advanced degrees in science and medicine and has litigated in the areas of medical 
malpractice, toxic torts and health law for over two decades before deciding to further her 
career and education in Israel. She also sits on the UNESCO Chair (Haifa) Bioethics 
Expert Advisory Committee and on the policy committee of the American Association of 
Public Health. 
 
††  DAVID A. FREEDMAN, STATISTICAL MODELS AND CAUSAL INFERENCE 60 (2010).  
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Rather than modeling actual weapons of mass destruction, in essence, the 
exercise artificially creates weapons of mass hysteria (“WMH”). 
Allocating billions of dollars to futile biodefense endeavors—or WMH—
is clearly wasteful. It also breeds suspicion about the government’s ability 
to accurately predict and prepare for biothreats, damaging citizens’ 
confidence in governmental anti-terrorism programs and in homeland-
security preparedness. Consistently overestimating epidemic risks suggests 
a systemic failure in methodology, highlighting the need for a scientific-
statecraft paradigm to properly assess these risks. 
For fear of being underprepared, the government continues to rely on 
worst-case scenario models. Trying to prove these models are flawed is 
fraught with political danger. What if these worst-case scenarios are in fact 
correct? Ignoring the possibility of calamity is a consideration no politician 
wishes to contemplate, even if overzealous projections ultimately cause 
more harm than more realistic and more prudent risk estimates. 
This article demonstrates that worst-case scenario mathematical 
models for projection purposes are invalid, dangerous, and possibly 
motivated by their proponents’ personal interests by using past smallpox 
epidemics as a case-study. Further, this work discusses historical facts that 
seriously undermine the assumptions used in homeland-security planning 
for smallpox and raises considerations that may be useful in planning for 
other biothreats. 
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I. Introduction 
After the 2001 and 2002 anthrax scares, official American bioterror 
priority lists were updated.1 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(“CDC”) in Atlanta, Georgia had refined its original list of high-profile bio-
agents based on the conclusions of Donald Henderson and his Working 
Group on Civilian Biodefense,2 put forth in 1999.3 The group identified six 
agents as particularly fearsome, and prominently featured smallpox as the 
worst of the Class A bioterrorist agents.4 By 2001 the CDC dramatically 
 
1. CYRIL WECHT, FORENSIC ASPECTS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM 426 (2004) 
(explaining that the CDC divides bioweapons into three categories; six agents, 
including smallpox, are listed in the highest-priority category). 
2. An original list of possible bioterrorist agents was developed by the World Health 
Organization in 1970. 
3. See Donald A. Henderson et al., Smallpox as a Biological Weapon: Medical and 
Public Health Management, 281 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 2127, 2127 (1999) (stating that 
Henderson’s report was prepared by the ad hoc Working Group on Civilian 
Biodefense, which included Thomas V. Inglesby, Peter B. Jahrling, Jerome Hauer, 
Michael T. Osterholm, and Tara O’Toole).  
4. Id.; see also N.Y. STATE DEP’T HEALTH, Smallpox Questions and Answers: The Disease 
and the Vaccine, N.Y. STATE (Apr. 2003), 
https://www.health.ny.gov/publications/7004/ (“Smallpox is classified as a 
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augmented the list.5 Among the new diseases listed was Ebola, now also 
considered a Class A bioterrorist threat due to its perceived high case-
fatality rate,6 ease of spread, and contagion.7 
To deal with the expected biothreats, states enacted myriad quarantine 
regulations,8 academic institutions composed manuals for disaster 
planning,9 public-health lawyers drafted model laws,10 government 
agencies developed contingency plans,11 Presidents Bush and Obama 
signed key Executive Orders,12 and millions of dollars were allocated to 
 
Category A agent by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Category A 
agents are believed to pose the greatest potential threat for adverse public health 
impact and have a moderate to high potential for large-scale dissemination . . . . 
Other Category A agents are anthrax, plague, botulism, tularemia, and viral 
hemorrhagic fevers.”); BAYLOR COLL. MED., Potential Bioterrorism Agents, 
https://www.bcm.edu/departments/molecular-virology-and-
microbiology/emerging-infections-and-biodefense/potential-bioterrorism-
agents (explaining that Class A bioterrorist agents are the agents that the CDC 
believes pose the highest risk to national security and have the most potential to 
cause public hysteria). 
5. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases A to Z, CDC (Feb. 
3, 2017), https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist.asp (listing Class A 
bioterrorist agents). 
6. BAYLOR COLL. MED., supra note 4 (noting that Ebola is a class A bioterrorist threat); 
Paolo Francesconi et al., Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever Transmission and Risk Factors 
of Contacts, Uganda, 9 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1430, 1436 (2003) (explaining 
that the original case-fatality rates were one hundred percent: “the higher death 
rate observed among primary and secondary case-patients (100%), in contrast 
with . . . the most recent patients (70.6%), could be explained by the treatment 
provided in the hospital, though this treatment was mainly supportive.”). 
7. P. B. Jahrling et al., Lethal infection of primates with variola virus as a model for 
human smallpox, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2017), 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/smallpox/lethalinfection/en/ (“Smallpox virus is 
acknowledged to pose a significant threat as a bioterrorist weapon because of its 
contagiousness and the absence of effective antiviral drugs.”). 
8. Janice Hopkins Tanne, Preventing “Dark Winter”—The Public Health System’s Role 
in Strengthening National Security, 1 CARNEGIE REP. 2, 11 (2002); see also Christine 
Grant, Public Health Law in the Time of Ebola: An Update, 11 SCI. TECH. LAWYER 3 
(2015) (describing two states’ quarantine regulations).  
9. See, e.g., UNIV. MO. SYS., How to Prepare and Implement a Disaster Recovery Plan 
(Dec. 30, 2010), 
https://www.umsystem.edu/ums/fa/management/records/disaster-prepare. 
10. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers 
Act: Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious 
Diseases, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 622 (2002). 
11. See, e.g., CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Notice to Readers: 25th Anniversary 
of the Last Case of Naturally Acquired Smallpox, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY 
REP. 952 (Oct. 25, 2002). 
12. Jared P. Cole, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33201, FEDERAL AND STATE QUARANTINE AND 
ISOLATION AUTHORITY 2 (2014); Executive Order 13295: Revised List of Quarantinable 
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academia to develop homeland-security programs.13 In 2005, the CDC 
proposed a regulation authorizing it to impound planes or ships with 
passengers who appeared ill with summary provisions allowing for up to 
a week’s detention.14 The regulation never passed, but the sentiment of 
the country was clear: better to restrict travel for anyone who might 
transmit a contagious disease than for a single American to succumb to 
one.15 By 2007, the United States operated more than 1356 level-three 
biosafety labs and fifteen level-four biosafety labs,16 presumably to devise 
treatment and preventive measures for bioterrorist and pandemic threats. 
To date, the results of their research are murky at best. 
It appears, however, that the bioterror-prevention tactics were for 
naught. In the ensuing decade, no bioterrorist-mediated event materialized 
and none appear on the event-horizon. Mother Nature, however, filled the 
gap. In 2014, she unleashed an epidemic of unseen proportions in recent 
times: the Ebola virus swept through Africa. In March, the World Health 
Organization (“WHO”) reported its outbreak in four districts of Guinea with 
eighty-six suspected cases and fifty-nine deaths.17 More cases were 
 
Communicable Diseases, 79 Fed. Reg. 45671 (Apr. 4, 2003) (amended July 31, 
2014) (“The following communicable diseases are hereby specified pursuant to 
section 361(b) of the Public Health Service Act: (a) Cholera; Diphtheria; infectious 
Tuberculosis; Plague; Smallpox; Yellow Fever; and Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers 
(Lassa, Marburg, Ebola, Congo-Crimean, and others not yet isolated or named).”); 
see also Executive Order 13375: Amendment to Executive Order 13295 Relating 
to Certain Influenza Virus and Quarantinable Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 17299 (Apr. 1, 2005); Executive Order 13674: Revised List of Quarantinable 
Communicable Diseases, 78 Fed. Reg. 45671 (July 31, 2014). 
13. KENNETH KING, GERMS GONE WILD: HOW THE UNCHECKED DEVELOPMENT OF BIO-DEFENSE 
THREATENS AMERICA 3 (2010). 
14. Eric Owens, PRESIDENT EBOLA: In 2010 Obama Administration Scrapped CDC 
Quarantine Regulations Aimed At Ebola, DAILY CALLER (Oct. 3, 2014), 
http://dailycaller.com/2014/10/03/president-ebola-in-2010-obama-
administration-scrapped-cdc-quarantine-regulations-aimed-at-ebola/; Control of 
Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. 229, 71892-71893 (proposed Nov. 30, 
2005). 
15. Joel G. Breman et al., Preventing the Return of Smallpox, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 463, 
465 (2003). 
16. Sharon Begley & Julie Steenhuysen, How secure are labs handling world’s 
deadliest pathogens?, REUTERS (Feb. 16, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-biosecurity-idUSTRE81E0R420120215 
(showing 1356 level-three biosafety labs exist); GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-08-108T, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE OVERSIGHT OF THE PROLIFERATION OF BSL-
3 AND BSL-4 LABORATORIES IN THE UNITED STATES, at 1 (2007). 
17. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease) Previous Updates: 
2014 West Africa Outbreak, CDC (Mar. 24, 2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/previous-
updates.html. 
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reported in neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone.18 Not long afterwards, 
Liberia declared an international state of emergency,19 generating fear that 
cascaded out of control; apocalyptic projections predicted 1.4 million cases 
by January, 2015.20 The WHO re-sounded the pandemic warning on August 
8, 2014,21 allocating billions of dollars and deploying thousands of personnel 
to infection zones as top-tier health officials around the world made 
potentially risky decisions.22 
The United States mounted an unprecedented response effort in terms 
of funding, allocation of person-power, and deployment of healthcare 
workers and auxiliary personnel. A White House press release announced 
that the U.S. would be “leverag[ing] the unique capabilities of the U.S. 
military and broader uniformed services to help bring the epidemic under 
control,” 23 which “would entail command and control, logistics expertise, 
training, engineering support and 350 million dollars.”24 The WHO 
 
18. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease) Previous Case 
Counts, CDC (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-
west-africa/previous-case-counts.html. 
19. Jonathan Paye-Layleh, Liberia declares state of emergency over Ebola virus, BBC 
(Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-28684561. 
20. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Questions and Answers: Estimating the Future 
Number of Cases in the Ebola Epidemic—Liberia and Sierra Leone, 2014–2015, CDC 
(Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/qa-
mmwr-estimating-future-cases.html [hereinafter Estimating the Future Number 
of Cases] (providing numbers that were widely disseminated by the press). 
21. Kate Kelland, WHO declares Ebola epidemic an international health emergency, 
REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-ebola-
emergency-idUSKBN0G80M620140808. 
22. The U.S. Government & Global Emerging Infectious Disease Preparedness and 
Response, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Dec. 8, 2014), http://kff.org/global-health-
policy/fact-sheet/the-u-s-government-global-emerging-infectious-disease-
preparedness-and-response/; see CDC Ebola Response Update Podcasts, CTRS. 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 17, 2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/what-cdc-is-
doing.html; Grant, supra note 7, at 1. 
23. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: U.S. 
Response to the Ebola Epidemic in West Africa (Sept. 16, 2014), available at 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/16/fact-sheet-
us-response-ebola-epidemic-west-africa. 
24. Id. (“U.S. Africa Command will . . . facilitate coordination with U.S. government 
and international relief efforts . . . which will involve an estimated 3,000 U.S. 
forces . . . [and] . . . transportation of equipment, supplies and personnel . . . . 
Command engineers will build additional Ebola Treatment Units in affected areas, 
and the U.S. Government will help recruit and organize medical personnel to staff 
them. Additionally, the Command will . . . train up to 500 health care providers 
per week, enabling healthcare workers to safely provide direct medical care to 
patients. The United States Public Health Service Commissioned Corps is preparing 
to deploy 65 Commissioned Corps officers to Liberia to manage and staff a 
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allocated more aid in October,25 after the CDC published its September 
Mortality and Morbidity Report (“MMWR”) that estimated approximately 
eight-thousand cases would occur in Liberia and Sierra Leone by September 
30, noting the figure could be 21,000 when correcting for underreporting.26 
To account for underreporting, the MMWR used a correction factor of 2.5, 
asserting that “for every case reported and recorded in publicly available 
case counts, an additional 1.5 cases are not recorded.”27 The CDC concluded 
that “without additional interventions or changes in community 
behavior . . . by January 20, 2015, there will be a total of 
approximately . . . 1.4 million [cases].”28 The CDC used a ninety percent 
case-fatality rate estimate for the Zaire subtype of Ebola and predicted 
there would be 1.26 million deaths;29 the WHO used an estimated case-
fatality rate of seventy percent, and predicted approximately one million 
deaths.30 
More than a year later, after WHO declared the epidemic over, a grand 
total of 28,638 cases and 11,315 deaths were reported worldwide.31 Of 
these fatalities, eighty-seven percent were in Liberia and Sierra Leone.32 The 
worldwide case-fatality rate did not even reach forty percent; in Liberia and 
 
previously announced Department of Defense (DOD) hospital to care for 
healthcare workers who become ill.”). 
25. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: The U.S. 
Response to the Ebola Epidemic in West Africa (Oct. 6, 2014), available at 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/06/fact-sheet-
us-response-ebola-epidemic-west-africa (“The United States already has 
committed more than $350 million toward fighting the outbreak in West Africa, 
including more than $111 million in humanitarian aid, and the Department of 
Defense (DoD) is prepared to devote more than $1 billion to the whole-of-
government Ebola response effort . . . . U.S. actions have galvanized millions of 
dollars in international funding and in-kind support.”). 
26. Estimating the Future Number of Cases, supra note 20. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. (noting 550,000 of the fatalities would be in Liberia and Sierra Leone). 
29. Anthony Sanchez et al., Reemergence of Ebola Virus in Africa, 1 EMERGING INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 96, 96 (1995). But see P. Becquart et al., How lethal is Ebola virus?, 
VIROLOGY BLOG (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.virology.ws/2012/01/18/how-lethal-is-
ebolavirus/. 
30. WORLD HEALTH ORG. EBOLA RESPONSE TEAM, Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa- The 
First 9 Months of the Epidemic and Forward Projections, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1481, 
1481 (2014); U.S Government & Global Emerging Infectious Disease Preparedness 
and Response, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., at 1 (Dec. 2014) http://kff.org/global-
health-policy/fact-sheet/the-u-s-government-global-emerging-infectious-
disease-preparedness-and-response/. 
31. Ebola: Mapping the Outbreak, BBC (Jan. 14, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28755033. 
32. Id. 
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Sierra Leone, it barely topped thirty-five percent, similar to the case-fatality 
rates for hantavirus and Legionnaires’ disease.33 
The press and public-health experts criticized WHO for its inadequate 
response efforts,34 yet the projection-versus-reality mismatch and resultant 
hysteria was never addressed. It appears that the CDC’s and WHO’s 
estimation methodologies were flawed due to a lack of critical information 
and rapidly changing parameters on the ground.35 Had this been the only 
incident of gross over-projection, one might attribute the mishap to an 
anomaly. However, the consistent pattern of over-projection calls into 
question the efficacy of mathematical modeling as a pandemic-projection 
tool. We saw similar overestimates for swine flu,36 avian flu,37 anthrax, and 
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (“MERS”).38 An all-but-certain and 
omnipresent bioterrorist-attack clarion call emerged: 
[a]s the 20th century drew to a close, most biological[-]defense 
professionals, both military and civilian, were in agreement that the 
 
33. Id. 
34. See Shepherd Mutsvara, World Health Organization to Blame for the Zika and Ebola Virus?, 
LIBERTY VOICE (Feb. 22, 2016), http://guardianlv.com/2016/02/world-health-organization/. 
35. Josh Michaud & Jennifer Kates, Measuring the Impact of Ebola: Will it Reach 
1.4 Million?, KAISER FOUND.N (Sept. 29, 2014), http://kff.org/global-health-
policy/perspective/measuring-the-impact-of-ebola-will-it-reach-1-4-million/ 
(“The model . . . which assumes no change in the trajectory of the 
epidemic . . . translates . . . to an equivalent [and absurd] rate in the U.S. 
population . . . [of] almost 45 million people nationally, and more than 90,000 in 
Washington, DC alone.”); see Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Fewer Ebola Case Go 
Unreported Than Thought, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/science/fewer-ebola-cases-go-
unreported-than-thought-study-finds-.html (“[R]esearchers said they had too 
little data to predict how many West Africans could eventually be infected, but 
enough to show that the dire predictions were inaccurate . . . . Epidemics surge 
and wane . . . so extrapolating an estimate from one month’s data to an entire 
outbreak was ‘not legitimate.’”). 
36. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 8443, 74 Fed. Reg. 55, 439 (Oct. 23, 2009); S. 2968, 
1085th Cong. §2 (2004). 
37. See, e.g., The Department of Defense Implementation Plan for Pandemic Influenza, 
DEP’T OF DEF. (2006), at 6; Kristin Choo, The Avian Flu Time Bomb, ABA JOURNAL 
(Nov. 29, 2005), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_avian_flu_time_bomb. 
38. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Revised Technical Instructions for Panel 
Physicians related to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndromes based on Executive 
Order 13674 (last updated Aug. 21, 2014), 
https://www.cdc.gov/immigrantrefugeehealth/exams/ti/panel/revised-
technical-instructions-panel-physicians-respiratory-syndromes-executive-order-
13674.html (stating that Executive Order 13674, which was signed on July 31, 
2014, shortly after the Ebola epidemic began “gives clear legal authority . . . to 
make MERS a communicable disease of public health significance.” (emphasis 
added)). 
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probability of a bioterrorist event occurring the United States was not 
a matter of if, but when . . . . ‘If’ is now behind us, and we are left with 
the burning issues of ‘who, where, when next, and why.’39 
These prophecies were based on mathematics and statistics, not 
science. For example, one commentator claimed that influenza pandemics 
“typically occurred every 10-50 years throughout recorded history,” 40 and 
as the last pandemic was in 1957, “we are ‘due’ for one.”41 In response, 
millions of dollars were allocated for flu vaccines—vaccines that later went 
unused.42 
Similar hyperbole emanated from the now largely-discredited Dark 
Winter (“DW”) war game, a pandemic-projection tool ostensibly designed 
to sensitize the government to the threat of a smallpox terrorist attack and 
the country’s lack of preparation.43 Some in the media and scientific 
community heavily criticized DW as a fable, questioning its basic 
assumptions,44 but DW nonetheless successfully launched the government-
spending juggernaut.45 In fact, shortly after presentation and publication of 
 
39. Anna Johnson-Winegar et al., Department of Defense Capabilities Supporting 
Bioterrorism Response, in BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DEFENSE, INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND 
COUNTER BIOTERRORISM 3 (Luther E. Lindler et al. eds., 2005). 
40. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO OUTBREAK COMMUNICATION 1 (2005). 
41. Sanjay Gupta, The Big One is Coming, and it’s Going to be a Flu Pandemic, CNN 
(Apr. 10, 2017), http://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/07/health/flu-pandemic-sanjay-
gupta/ (“When [the pandemic happens] . . . it will probably have a greater impact 
on humanity than anything else currently happening in the world.”). 
42. Renae Merle, Deal for Smallpox Vaccine Could Jump-Start BioShield, WASH. POST, 
Jun. 7, 2007, at D01; see Mae-Wan Ho, Swine Flue (is there an e at the end of flu?) 
a “Faked Pandemic”, SCIENCE IN SOC’Y (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.i-
sis.org.uk/swineFluaFakedPandemic.php (Providing subtitles such as: 
“Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe agree to launch enquiry amid 
revelations of gross conflicts of interests among experts advising the WHO to 
declare the swine flu pandemic,” and “WHO expert advisory group linked to 
pharmaceutical industry”; further stating “[a]t the height of the pandemic scare, 
UK’s Chief Medical Officer warned of 65,000 deaths. The death toll [as of Jan 29, 
2010] now stands at 251; and the UK government is not trying to offload up to £1 
billion worth of unwanted swine flu vaccines.”). 
43. See infra, Section 2.A, 2.B.  
44. KING, supra note 13. See also Steven Milloy, Smallpox Attack Exaggerated, FOX 
NEWS (July 10, 2003), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2003/07/10/smallpox-
attack-exaggerated.print.html (attacking the credibility of DW). 
45. See Barbara P. Billauer, The Specter of Bio-terrorism: Real Dangers of the 
Imaginary Enemy presentated at the Sandia National Laboratory Conference on 
Strategic Indirect Warfare, Albuquerque, N.M. (unpublished) (on file with author) 
(Dec. 2002) (discussing the fact that pertussis and measles epidemics were 
overlooked at times when bioterrorist-scare and epidemic-scare scenarios were 
being broadcast and fostered by the public-health “gloom and doomers,” and that 
increases in pertussis can be correlated with underproduction of pertussis 
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the fable, which projected three million cases of smallpox and one million 
deaths in six weeks, Congress enacted Operation BioShield, a government 
program allocating billions of dollars to address projected risks from this 
hypothetical cataclysm.46 Allocations to biodefense over the past fifteen 
years have burgeoned substantially, now reaching about eighty billion 
dollars.47 
As a further consequence, smallpox vaccines are still routinely 
administered to soldiers.48 Even though the threat from Iraq’s weapons-of-
mass-destruction program has been eliminated—along with Saddam. Many 
in the military oppose vaccination,49 citing to the fact that soldiers and their 
spouses have experienced serious adverse reactions.50 Some allege that 
 
vaccine, a shortage resulting from limited vaccine-manufacturing capacity, which 
was directed to other pandemic scares). 
46. Sherwood Ross, America the Beautiful’s Germ Warfare Rash, MWC NEWS (Nov. 9, 
2013), http://mwcnews.net/focus/politics/33240-germ-warfare.html (explaining 
that Project Bioshield was enacted in 2004 and allocated five billion dollars to 
development and production of vaccines—which ordinarily take months to 
produce, and are mired in FDA regulations—to be used in the event of a terrorist 
attack, and that intelligence reports on terrorist activities are ineffective and have 
been wrong or were misinterpreted); Peptide Therapeutics Group, OraVax, Inc. 
Awarded Contract to Develop, Manufacture and Manage A National Stockpile of 
Smallpox Vaccine for Civil Defense, PRNEWS.COM (Sept. 20, 2000), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/oravax-inc-awarded-contract-to-
develop-manufacture-and-manage-a-national-stockpile-of-smallpox-vaccine-for-
civil-defense-73342157.html (noting that one of the first allocations for 
bioterrorism-defense funding, which was made on the recommendations of the 
Working Group on Civilian Biodefense, was a $343 million contract with OraVax, 
who would be responsible for “production in large-scale cell cultures, using 
modern methods for the manufacture of live-viral vaccines.”). 
47. Tara Kirk Sell & Matthew Watson, Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, FY2013-
FY2014, 11 BIOSECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM 196, 196, 198 (2013) (explaining that 
from 2001 through 2014, seventy-ninety billion dollars were allocated to 
biodefense, fourteen billion dollars of which were spent on programs that related 
solely to biodefense). Some say Bill Gates is continuing the clarion call. See 
Rebecca Perring, Terrorists Could Wipe Out 30 Million People by Weaponising [sic] 
Smallpox, Bill Gates Warns, EXPRESS (last updated Apr. 20, 2017, 5:24 PM), 
http://www.express.co.uk/news/science/794355/Bill-Gates-bioterrorism-
weaponise-smallpox-virus-terrorists-wipe-out-30-million (“Bill Gates has warned 
a biological terror attack more destructive than a nuclear attack could wipe out 
30 million people.”). 
48. DAVID KOPLOW, SMALLPOX: THE FIGHT TO ERADICATE A GLOBAL SCOURGE 27 (2004) 
(explaining that the Department of Defense contracted “with a Maryland firm 
called BioReliance to deliver 300,000 doses of an improved vaccine for $22.4 
million (approximately $70 per dose). This inventory, to be administered . . . to 
service members deployed to locations of greatest threat.”). 
49. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Soldier’s Smallpox Inoculation Sickens Son, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 18, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/18/health/18smallpox.html.  
50. Id.; Samuel A. Bozette et al., A Model for a Smallpox-Vaccination Policy, 348 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 416, 417 (2003); Barbara P. Billauer, The Specter of Bioterrorism: Real 
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one or more members of the Working Group on Biodefense helped 
institutionalize the government’s initial bioterror list, deriving financial or 
other benefits from it, such as lucrative consulting contracts.51 Lamentable 
as this may be, some perversely give it a positive spin: 
Polemicists in the public[-]health field . . . argue that the furor 
generated by fears of bioterrorism has created a valuable 
opportunity to secure funding for notoriously underfunded public[-
]health systems . . . . In this way, the threat of bioterrorism may be 
harnessed to create historic opportunities for the diversion of federal 
spending away from military defenses towards strengthening broad-
based public[-]health capabilities.52 
One wonders, however, whether fraudulent resource allocation can ever 
be proper. 
Despite alarmist overfunding, when Ebola struck, the government 
ignored its pandemic-planning initiatives, including its successful past 
experience with severe acute respiratory syndrome (“SARS”).53 During the 
SARS epidemic, the Department of Health issued and enforced travel 
advisories.54 No one who was infected was allowed to travel.55 But when 
Ebola struck, the State Department rejected calls for restricting travel from 
West Africa, and sick citizens returned to the United States,56 infecting 
others. Perhaps not surprisingly, two new Ebola cases developed on 
American soil. This situation reignited debates about quarantine and 
isolation that had been resolved in prior pandemic-response initiatives—or 
 
Dangers of the Imaginary Enemy, Sandia National Laboratory Conference on 
Strategic Indirect Warfare (Dec. 2002) (on file with author). 
51. See, e.g., Consulting Services Agreement Between Emergent BioSolutions Inc. & 
The Hauer Group (Apr. 1, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1367644/000136764409000009/exhib
it10_25.htm (providing a contract upon which the Securities and Exchange 
Commission based a prosecution of a biopharmaceutical company). 
52. Toyin Ajayi, Smallpox and Bioterrorism, 3 STAN. J. INT’L RELATIONS 1, 5 (2002). 
53. See CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Remembering SARS: A Deadly Puzzle and 
the Efforts to Solve It, https://www.cdc.gov/about/history/sars/feature.htm (last 
updated Apr. 26, 2013) (showing that during the 2003 outbreak of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS), U.S. patients were isolated until they were no longer 
infectious). 
54. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Update: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome --- 
United States, 2003, 52 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 388 (2003). 
55. Jason Singer & Sarah McBride, SARS-Related Travel Bans Hit Asia’s Finance Sector, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2003), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB104939964765276600. 
56. Karen Weintraub, Why U.S. is Reluctant to Issue Travel Ban on Ebola-Stricken West 
Africa, NAT. GEO. (Oct. 7, 2014), 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/10/141007-ebola-travel-ban-
restrictions-health-world/. 
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so we thought.57 And, fifteen years into government allocations and 
Biosafety Labs directed to produce antidotes, no vaccine or drug or 
antiserum was available to address Ebola. Only by the close of the epidemic 
did we see commercial ventures beginning to produce antidotes. 
The significance of these issues from a national-security perspective is 
manifold. Faulty threat assessments can result in misallocating resources 
and diverting attention from real threats, and illusory bio-threats may 
desensitize the population to future warnings. These factors may help 
explain why returning Ebola-exposed Americans refused to abide by 
isolation or quarantine orders.58 In the case of Ebola, further transmission 
in the United States was limited, but we may not be so lucky the next time. 
As national security becomes an ever-increasing concern,59 
prioritization of spending and efficient risk communication become 
paramount concerns. Wasted money and “crying wolf” are as detrimental 
to the country’s security as are insufficient resource allocation, inefficient 
use of resources and poor risk communication.60 It is therefore important 
to institute a “scientific-statecraft” paradigm in which science-based policy 
helps effectuate national-security objectives. This will allow the country to 
responsibly reevaluate response methodologies before the next outbreak 
using valid and reliable scientific evidence, rather than relying on sterile and 
hysteria-mongering mathematical projections. 
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the differences and 
deficiencies between abstract mathematical modeling—especially the mix-
and-match, worst-case-scenario approach used in DW—and realities of 
real-life epidemics using our experiences with smallpox for illustration. This 
review demonstrates the futility of relying on pure mathematical modeling 
tools for pandemic projection and planning without real-time upgrades and 
integration of biological and physical constraints—including data regarding 
diseases’ particle-transport properties and weather conditions,61 which of 
course, can never be accurately predicted. 62 
 
57. Id. 
58. See, e.g., Jason Hanna & Ashley Fantz, Maine nurse won’t submit to Ebola 
quarantine, lawyer says, CNN (Oct. 29, 2014, 1:35 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/29/health/us-ebola/. 
59. Norman Bailey, National Interest versus National Security? The Case of Iraq, INST. 
FOR GLOBAL ECON. GROWTH, available at 
www.igeg.org/BaileyNationalInterestSecur.html (accessed using Wayback 
Machine to search prior to 2015). 
60. See Mutsvara, supra note 34. 
61. See generally Donald A. Fraser, Sizing Methodology: Characteristics of Airborne 
Particles, in THE INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENT—ITS EVALUATION AND CONTROL 155 (1973). 
62. Henderson et al., supra note 3, at 2127 (noting the preference of the virus for low 
humidity and cold). 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
Weapons of Mass Hysteria, Faulty Biothreat Predictions, and Their Impact on 
National (In)Security: A Case-Study of Smallpox 
359 
II. Background 
Gloom and doom scenarios about terrorists using smallpox as a 
bioweapon abound.63 These scenarios come from politicians and reputable 
scientists alike,64 and prestigious journals publish them. For example, one 
eminent author writes, alarmingly, that: 
[t]he former Soviet Union developed variola virus, which causes 
smallpox, for use as a biologic weapon, and supplies may have fallen 
into other hands. As Lev Sandakhchiyev, the director of Russia’s 
Vektor Institute, has warned, “All you need is a sick fanatic to get to 
a populated place.” U.S. experts agree.65 
The author does not tell us that this pronouncement is based on 
information from the now largely-discredited Soviet defector Ken Alibek, 
also known as Colonel Kanatzhan Alibekov,66 whose financial conflicts of 
interest should have barred him from publishing in any reputable scientific 
journal.67 
Here’s another example: 
[t]he potential of smallpox as a biological weapon is most 
dramatically illustrated by two European smallpox outbreaks in the 
1970s. The first occurred in Meschede, Germany in 1970(-1). This 
outbreak illustrates that smallpox virus in an aerosol suspension can 
spread widely and infect at very low doses. Another outbreak 
occurred in Yugoslavia in February 1972(-1). Despite routine 
vaccination in Yugoslavia, the first case in the 1972 outbreak resulted 
 
63. See, e.g., Martin I. Meltzer, Risks and Benefits of Preexposure and Postexposure 
Smallpox Vaccination, 9 J. EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES, 1363, 1363 (2003) 
(identifying smallpox as a potential bioterrorist weapon). 
64. Smallpox Vaccinations for Everyone, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2002), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2002/dec/13/20021213-105133-
4649r/ (detailing Senator Bill Frist’s comment “I think the risk of smallpox in the 
United States is increasing” and his advocacy for a mass-vaccination policy); 
RICHARD MULLER, PHYSICS FOR FUTURE PRESIDENTS 54 (2008) (advising future leaders that 
smallpox “spreads like a chain reaction”). Even Bill Gates is not immune from 
sounding in. See Perring, supra note 47. 
65. William J. Bicknell, The Case for Voluntary Smallpox Vaccination, 346 NEW ENG. J. 
MED 1323, 1323 (2002). 
66. David Willman, Selling the Threat of Bioterrorism, L.A. TIMES (July 1, 2007), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jul/01/nation/na-alibek1 
67. Id. (“His most sensational research findings . . . have not withstood peer review by 
scientific specialists. His promotion of nonprescription pills—sold in his name over 
the Internet and claiming to bolster the immune system—was ridiculed by some 
scientists. He resigned as executive director of a Virginia university’s biodefense 
center 10 months ago while facing internal strife over his stewardship . . . . By his 
count, Alibek has won about $28 million in federal grants or contracts.”). 
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in 11 others; those 11, on average, each infected 13 more. Other 
outbreaks in Europe from 1958 on showed that such explosive spread 
was not unusual during the seasonal period of high transmission . . . . 
One can only speculate on the probable rapidity of spread of the 
smallpox virus in a population where no one younger than 25 years 
of age has ever been vaccinated and older persons have little 
remaining residual immunity.68 
We are not told, however, that the two epidemics referred to in this quote 
do not support claims that smallpox outbreaks typically lead to mass 
casualty scenarios. Could an unknowing reader possibly guess that these 
two epidemics together produced a total of only 195 cases?69 
And here’s another: 
[s]mallpox is the ultimate weapon of mass destruction. It has killed 
more people throughout history than any other infectious disease, 
including the bubonic plague. The U.S. population grows more 
vulnerable to the potential ravages of its effects as time goes by.70 
The CDC officially addressed the issue in 1999, when a meeting of experts 
found that “of all the potential biological weapons identified, smallpox was 
unanimously determined to pose the greatest threat to the United 
States.”71 This fear ostensibly stemmed from difficulties inherent in 
diagnosis and rapidly containing a disease most physicians had never 
seen.72 The CDC disregarded contrary views—even when voiced by eminent 
scientists.73 For example, they failed to acknowledge that one model 
required that before the risks associated with the smallpox vaccine could 
be justified, a smallpox bio-agent would need to be released at ten airports 
simultaneously.74 The hysteria spiraled: the Bush administration even 
 
68. D.A. Henderson, Smallpox: Clinical and Epidemiologic Features, 5 EMERGING 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 537, 538 (1999). 
69. See infra Part V.E, V.F. 
70. Ajayi, supra note 52. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. See, e.g., Jonathan Tucker, Historical Trends Related to Bioterrorism: An Empirical 
Analysis, 5 J. EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 498, 503 (1999) (“Few terrorist groups 
possess the scientific-technical resources required for the successful large-scale 
release of a biological agent.”); Martin Eichner & Klaus Dietz, Transmission 
Potential of Smallpox: Estimates Based on Detailed Data From an Outbreak, 158 
AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 110, 116 (“Fenner et al. who already discussed a possible 
bioterrorist attack with variola virus in 1988 concluded, ‘the risk of any such act 
leading to the reestablishment of endemic smallpox should not be 
exaggerated.’”). 
74. Bozette et al., supra note 50, at 419. 
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ignored the CDC’s recommendation against mass smallpox vaccination and 
began buying up existing stores and contracting for more.75 
So starts the saga of the modern terrorization of smallpox, resulting in 
the American government’s initial procurement of over 300 million vaccine 
doses.76 The original order was more than enough for one dose for every 
citizen—including the fifty million for whom administration of the vaccine 
was medically contraindicated due to pre-existing or immunosuppressive 
conditions,77 or because they were taking drugs that would make them 
more susceptible to known adverse events associated with the vaccine,78or  
other ethical considerations.79 The cost: roughly two billion dollars.80 
Vaccine hoarding continues—even in the face of negative data, and the cost 
keeps escalating. The goal is, and was, to protect all citizens by mass 
 
75. CDC Update: CDC Releases Draft Smallpox Response Plan, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Nov. 26, 2001) [hereinafter CDC Update], 
https://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/r011126.htm (explaining the CDC is against 
mass vaccination); Robert Roos, Bush Announces Smallpox Vaccination Plan for 
Health Workers, CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESEARCH & POL’Y (Dec. 13, 2002), 
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2002/12/bush-announces-
smallpox-vaccination-plan-military-health-workers (showing Bush Administration 
plans for mass vaccination). 
76. DAVID A. KOPLOW, SMALLPOX: THE FIGHT TO ERADICATE A GLOBAL SCOURGE 217 (2003) 
(stating that George Bush proposed obtaining 300 million doses of smallpox 
vaccine in 2001). 
77. See U.S. Government Expands Population Eligible to Receive Bavarian Nordic’s 
Smallpox Vaccine in an Emergency, BAVARIAN NORDIC (July 11, 2012), 
http://www.bavarian-nordic.com/media/media/news.aspx?news=1880 
(Explaining that “28 million people with atopic dermatitis, 10 million people with 
compromised immune systems, and their household contacts, totaling 66 million 
people,” were not eligible for a traditional smallpox vaccine.). 
78. US Population by Year, MULTPL.COM, http://www.multpl.com/united-states-
population/table (noting that in 2001, there were 286 million American citizens.);  
Meltzer, supra note 63, at 1363; Keith Bradsher, & Melody Petersen, Drug Makers 
Plan Vaccines for Smallpox, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/25/business/a-nation-challenged-
pharmaceuticals-drug-makers-plan-vaccines-for-smallpox.html (“Tommy G. 
Thompson, secretary of health and human services, asked Congress last week for 
$509 million to acquire 300 million doses of smallpox vaccine, and the government 
initially invited four companies to work on vaccines. Ten vaccine makers have 
already submitted proposals outlining their capabilities, Mr. Thompson said 
yesterday.”). 
79. Would the eleven million illegal aliens be included in any vaccination campaign? 
Would the 2.2 million prisoners be administered the vaccine, which by definition 
would be experimental? IRB regulations prohibit experimental drug use on 
prisoners, leaving this a vexing bioethical problem. The data are silent on these 
questions. 
80. Aaron Smith, U.S. gears up for anthrax, smallpox, CNN (Sept. 16, 2005), 
http://money.cnn.com/2005/09/16/news/fortune500/stockpile/. 
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vaccination.81 However, the scientific support is wanting: adequate 
scientific support from public-health experts establishing that mass 
vaccination would be the best mechanism to protect the public did not (and 
does not) exist.82 
III. Are Models Beautiful? 
A. Re-Analysis of Mathematical Modeling of Disease Projections 
So, what would a smallpox outbreak look like? That question has 
spawned a new growth industry since September 11, 2001—the vaccine 
model industry. At least six United States research groups are building 
epidemic computer models, enabling them not only to project its possible 
course under different scenarios,83 but also to test the effect of vaccination 
and quarantine strategies.84 Many of these models are still in development 
and their results are contradictory, but none are as gloomy as DW,85 the 
hypothetical fantasy war game discussed earlier, which projected a 
runaway smallpox epidemic.86 DW’s assumptions and its projected results 
have since been debunked,87 although U.S. policy, as well as those of other 
countries, still rely on it.88 
Conventional mathematical models identify key parameters involved in 
epidemic transmission, and selected variables are plugged into the 
program.89 The computer then spits out risk estimates without a person 
ever setting foot in a quarantined town or village. In the words of one 
expert: 
 
81. CDC Update, supra note 75. 
82. See e.g., J. Michael Lane & Joel Goldstein, Evaluation of 21st-Century Risks of 
Smallpox Vaccination and Policy Options, 138 AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS - AM. SOC’Y 
OF INTERNAL MED. 488, 488 (2003). See also Babak Pourbohloul et al., Modeling 
Control Strategies of Respiratory Pathogens, 11 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1249 
(2005). 
83. See Chris Barrett et. al, If Smallpox Strikes Portland, 292 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 56 
(2005) (explaining that epidemiologists use mathematical models, which are 
straight-forward computational systems, to study the spread of infectious 
diseases.). 
84. Edward H. Kaplan et al., Emergency Response to a Smallpox Attack: The Case for 
Mass Vaccination, 99 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1035, 1035 (2002). 
85. Martin Enserink, News Focus Bioterrorism: How Devastating Would a Smallpox 
Attack Really Be?, 296 SCIENCE 1592, 1592 (2002). 
86. See JOHNS HOPKINS CTR. FOR CIVILIAN BIODEFENSE ET AL., DARK WINTER: BIOTERRORISM 
EXERCISE (2001) (hereinafter Dark Winter or DW). 
87. Enserink, supra note 85, at 1593. 
88. Terry L. Schrader & Edward Campion, Smallpox Vaccination – The Call to Arms, 348 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 381, 381 (2003). 
89. Michaud & Kates, supra note 35. 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
Weapons of Mass Hysteria, Faulty Biothreat Predictions, and Their Impact on 
National (In)Security: A Case-Study of Smallpox 
363 
controversy exists regarding the best method of protecting the public 
against the potential release of smallpox as a biological weapon. 
Infectious disease modeling plays an important role in this dialog, 
and . . . is critical to producing appropriate predictive models and 
understanding which controls will work best under varying 
conditions.90 
According to one public-health expert, “[m]odeling smallpox poses 
even more unusual challenges to assure that proper biological, social and 
spatial factors affecting the spread are accounted for.”91 Many smallpox 
projections the “gloomers and doomers” espouse used cherry-picked 
variables from different epidemics strung together in one mishmashed 
model,92 thereby creating artificial worst-case scenarios.93 In other words, 
the data culled for each parameter were selected from different epidemics 
and mixed and matched to artificially create one biologically implausible 
model. This method is programmed to produce the most extreme and 
catastrophic calculations possible, 94 generating fear and hysteria that fed 
the cry for maximum federal funding.95 
I argue that misused modeling was the root cause of the Ebola 
overestimates. In estimating the Ebola impact, models relied on one 
parameter—the reproductive rate, which at the time was “doubling every 
24 days in Liberia and every 30 days in Sierra Leone.”96 The model assumed 
that rate was invariable, i.e., it would be constant throughout the epidemic. 
 
90. Donald K. Milton, What was the primary mode of smallpox transmission? 
Implications for biodefense, 2 FRONTIERS IN CELLULAR & INFECTION MICROBIOLOGY (2012) 
(internal citations omitted). 
91. Neil M. Ferguson et al., Planning for Smallpox Outbreaks, 425 NATURE 681, 681 
(2003). 
92. See Dark Winter, supra note 86.  
93. See generally Kaplan et al., supra note 84. 
94. Milton, supra note 90 (“The rapidity with which smallpox would spread in a 
developed nation is not known and is a major source of uncertainty in models 
used for public health planning.”) (citations omitted); see Barret et al., supra note 
94, at 56 (A more sophisticated modeling method allows for variable cost estimate 
projections, i.e., the modelers can alter the model to reflect a mild, moderate, or 
severe epidemic—arbitrarily determined based on the lowest, highest and mid-
range estimates mathematically possible, but again without regard to biologic 
plausibility. A third and even more sophisticated model considers the likelihood 
and length of contact between individuals. This method, produced at Los Alamos 
National Laboratory by Stephen Eubank, more accurately captures replication and 
transmission rates by simulating the behavior of individuals in a community. It 
claims to have data on each of the 1.6 million people in Portland, Oregon and their 
interaction patterns.). 
95. KING, supra note 13, at 435. 
96. Michaud & Kates, supra note 35. 
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In actuality, the reproduction rate was not invariable; it later decreased, as 
it did in every epidemic I reviewed.97 
To properly evaluate mathematical modeling, it is necessary to properly 
identify parameters involved in spread. The critical parameters are the 
number of cases each person infects (“reproductive number”), the number 
of generations over which the infection is transmissible (“transmission 
rate”), and the case-fatality rate—of the people infected, the number who 
died.98 Other factors also influence spread, although they are generally 
excluded for want of accurate measurements.99 After the variables are 
identified, appropriate data are “plugged into” the model. If the model, 
even if using appropriate parameters, uses inappropriate data, the 
projections will be flawed.100 
B. Re-Modeling Dark Winter (DW) 
As noted, the inferno that fueled the smallpox hysteria and continues 
to keep it smoldering is the Dark Winter (“DW”) war-game.101 In DW, an 
illustrative group of governmental and media guinea pigs—some of whom 
appear to have been scientifically illiterate—were exposed to an imaginary 
fable loosely based on an amalgam of worst case data from several past 
epidemics.102 
The exercise took place on June 22 and 23, 2001, but the game 
forecasted that the hypothetical outbreak was to occur about a year and a 
 
97. See, e.g., Michael Washington et al., Generic EbolaResponse (ER) Modeling the 
spread of disease impact & intervention, CDC (Sept. 22, 2014), 
https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/24900; see also Martin I. Meltzer et al., 
Estimating the Future Number of Cases in the Ebola Epidemic—Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, 2014-2015, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. SUPPS. 1 (Sept. 2014). 
98. Milton, supra note 90; See also Pourbohloul et al., supra note 82, at 1250. 
99. See, e.g., Milton, supra note 90, at 4 (stating that particle size, weather conditions, 
proximity and duration of exposure between patient and others were not 
reported). 
100. The gloom and doom scenarios have even infected high school students, who cite 
these statistics with wild abandon. See., e.g., JOE FETSCH, SMALLPOX MARTYR BIO-
TERRORISM SCENARIO MODELING COMPUTER SYSTEMS LAB (Jan. 27, 2010), available at  
https://www.tjhsst.edu/~rlatimer/techlab10/Per5/SecondQuarter/FetschPaper
Q2-10.pdf (“[S]mallpox has a fatality rate between 30 and 40 percent and spreads 
like wildfire both locally and globally, traveling around the world in a month 
because of the 2 week incubation period in which no symptoms are shown from 
the infected person, as they travel around, moving to uninfected cities or healthy 
sections of a population before the sudden outbreak catches them by surprise.”). 
101. See generally Dark Winter, supra note 86. 
102. See Reuven Ben-Shalom, The Tragedy of Scientific Ignorance: Shirking scientific 
research and failing to implement methodologies derived from it leads to 
mediocrity, JERUSALEM POST, at 19 (Jan. 26, 2017), 
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/The-tragedy-of-scientific-ignorance-47972 
(arguing that the media is scientifically illiterate). 
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half hence, in December, 2002. The locales were selected, ostensibly, 
because normally weather conditions at that time would have been 
expected to be conducive to spread.103 At the outset, the participants were 
primed with the claim that “of all potential biological weapons, smallpox is 
historically the most ominous and feared.”104 
DW’s smallpox outbreak begins with the emergence of twenty index 
cases in Oklahoma City on December 1, 2002. By December 9, the fable 
forecasts that fifty-three cases were diagnosed across three non-
contiguous states. At the end of six weeks, three million people were 
affected and one million were dead.105 The game does not explain how or 
where the cases were infected, other than to state vaguely that some 
imaginary aerosolized biological weapon had caused the infections. These 
projections were modeled on at least ten faulty assumptions, eight of which 
are mentioned here. All ten are then discussed in greater depth below. 
First, the projections assumed that the initial attack was from 
weaponized smallpox,106 similar to what the former Soviet Union would 
have developed in a secret bioweapons program.107 However, to the best of 
our knowledge no such weapon exists, nor is it even realistically or 
scientifically feasible.108 Even now, fifteen years later, it is clear that DW was 
not based on what any hostile country actually had or currently has, but on 
what DW’s creators believed such countries might have had—even though 
such beliefs lacked evidence.109 
 
103. See, e.g., Oklahoma Ice Storms, 2000-2007, OKLAHOMAN (Jan. 25, 2009, 12:00 AM), 
http://newsok.com/article/3340695 (documenting weather that would have 
theoretically scuttled the effectiveness of any attack); see infra note 213, at 41. 
104. Tara O’Toole et al., Shining Light on “Dark Winter” 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
972, 972; see also Dark Winter, supra note 92. 
105. See Dark Winter, supra note 92. 
106. Dave Duffy, Dark Winter: A simulated terrorist attack on three American cities 
using weaponized smallpox, 81 BACKWOODS HOME MAG. (2003), 
http://www.backwoodshome.com/dark-winter/. 
107. Id. 
108. See infra, Section VI.A.7. The belief that smallpox can be weaponized is predicated 
on the idea that smallpox can be transmitted in an airborne fashion, which, though 
theoretically possible, practically never occurs (if it can occur at all). CTRS. DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, Transmission: How Does Smallpox Spread? (June 7, 2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/smallpox/transmission/index.html (stating that airborne 
transmission of smallpox has “rarely” occurred). When it is said to be responsible 
for an outbreak, its effects have historically been limited to one generation of 
spread. Duffy, supra note 106. 
109. Even Colin Powell’s speech at the United Nations attempting to cajole 
international support for the US attack on Iraq claimed at most “Iraq had the 
wherewithal” to stage a smallpox attack, a meaningless if not reckless statement. 
Transcript of Powell’s U.N. Presentation, CNN (Feb. 5, 2003), 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.transcript.05/ (emphasis 
added). 
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Second, the program assumes that 228 million United States citizens 
were highly susceptible to infection.110 
Third, the program assumes that each infected person infected ten 
others, i.e., had a replication rate of ten.111 
Fourth, that the epidemic lasted three to four generations.112 The 
explicit prediction of three thousand people infected in the first generation 
and three million four generations later—giving an implicit assumption that 
the replication rate remained constant over the four generations of 
transmission. 
Fifth, the scenario states the CDC had twelve million vaccine doses 
available at the time of the outbreak, and that new vaccine would not be 
available for at least four weeks;113 the incorrect assumption that the 
United States would have a dearth of available vaccine was probably the 
most explosive factor and induced the most hysteria as reported in the 
fable, and as apparently was experienced by the participants. In reality, the 
CDC actually had fifteen million doses on hand in December 2002 and the 
Department of Defense (“DOD”) coincidently found another seventy-five to 
ninety million a few months later.114 Finally, shortly after the exercise 
Anthony Fauci of the National Institute of Health determined that dilution 
of the vaccine is effective at a 1:5 or 1:10,115 generating up to 150 million 
doses using the CDC’s then available stockpile and another 375 million using 
DOD’s supply. 
The sixth assumption was that there would be a delay in diagnosis. The 
game’s authors state that the United States is 
 
110. Duffy, supra note 106. 
111. Id. With a replication rate of ten, there would have to be three hundred index 
cases, not twenty as the scenario states, or else the epidemic would have had to 
run five or six generations—virtually unheard of in the last century—rather than 
four, as the program postulates. In essence, any real event associated with the 
DW data would indicate that it is presented beginning at the second generation, 
not the first as represented.  
112. Id. 
113. O’Toole et al., supra note 104. 
114. Larry Kerr, Panel III—Partnerships Against Bioterrorism, NAT’L ACAD. PRESS (2005), 
https://www.nap.edu/read/11300/chapter/6; see also infra, Section V.B. 
Available research disclosed that as of 1962, dilution was effective at a titer of 
1:30. It appears no one even researched the possibility before the war game was 
developed or presented, nor even by American scientists afterwards. See Douglas 
& Edgar, infra note 248, at 614; see also, Smallpox in Bradford, Medical 
Memoranda, Smallpox Vaccination in a University and Economy in Use of Vaccine, 
1 B. MED. J. 614, 614 (Mar. 3, 1962) [hereinafter Vaccination in a University]. 
115. Luciana Borio, Dilution of Smallpox Vaccine, Revisited, CLINICIANS’ BIOSECUIRTY NEWS 
(Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.upmc-
cbn.org/report_archive/2007/cbnreport_03012007.html (“Under emergency 
circumstances [smallpox vaccine] could be diluted 1:5, if not 1:10, with minimal 
loss of efficacy.”). 
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a highly mobile society. By the time the first victims are diagnosed 
with smallpox . . . the disease will already have begun spreading to a 
second generation of victims. Some of the initial victims . . . will have 
travelled [sic] to other cities by that time. Since few American doctors 
have ever seen a case of smallpox, and since the initial symptoms 
resemble flu, diagnosis is liable to be slow.116 
The seventh faulty assumption was that the case-fatality rate would be 
thirty percent; in the last century’s reality, the worst-case case-fatality rates 
for smallpox range from fifteen to twenty percent.117 
An eighth faulty assumption was that the weather in Oklahoma City on 
the projected date of the attack would have fostered spread—if anything, 
the actual weather on the projected day and locale of the attack would have 
significantly curtailed transmission,118 something no planner or terrorist 
could possibly have forecasted. 
C. Parameters for Evaluating Disease Transmission 
1. Exposure and Attack Rate 
The critical feature in disease causation is adequate exposure to a 
noxious agent. Whether an individual contracts a disease depends on 
whether the target organ receives sufficient exposure to the pathogen, or 
adequate dose,119 which explains why brief contact with many diseases 
usually does not cause illness.120 Indeed, exposure to small amounts of 
smallpox was the preferred means of preventing the disease during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.121 
Whether exposure is adequate depends on the route, duration, and 
amount of exposure, for, as Paracelsus said, “the dose makes the poison.”122 
 
116. Duffy, supra note 106. 
117. DAN LONGO ET AL., HARRISON’S TEXTBOOK OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1774 (18th ed. 2011) 
(indicating that the world-wide, and presumably historical, case-fatality rate was 
20 percent). 
118. Oklahoma Ice Storms, supra note 103. 
119. Gordon G. Heiner et al., A Study of Intrafamilial Transmission of Smallpox, 94 AM. 
J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 316, 321 (1971) (“[T]he effect of certain differences in exposure 
patterns was clearly detectable. Contacts who had ‘constant’ exposure, e.g., 
mothers, other female relatives and young children, showed significantly higher 
attack rates than persons whose exposure was only ‘daily.’”). 
120. Id. (“Contacts whose duration of exposure was seven days or more showed 
significantly higher attack rates than persons exposed for less than seven days.”). 
121. Stefan Riedel, Edward Jenner and the history of smallpox and vaccination, 18 
BAYLOR UNIV. MED. CTR. PROCEEDINGS 21, 22 (2005). 
122. Juliana Anderson, Paracelsus, TOXICOLOGY (Nov. 12, 2013), 
http://www.toxipedia.org/display/toxipedia/Paracelsus (explaining that “the 
dose makes the poison,” means “the amount of a substance the person is exposed 
to is as important as the substance”). 
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Exposure is also influenced by the noxious agent’s hardiness, its method of 
spread, and whether environmental conditions foster the agent’s 
proliferation.123 Because exposure is difficult to assess, mathematical 
models often omit this variable.124 
Other variables also impact transmission, such as the virus’s 
pathogenicity. A virus’s pathogenicity may be gleaned by its attack rate,125 
based on how many exposed people actually become sick.126 Because it is 
difficult to assess how many people are exposed to a virus but do not fall ill, 
models also typically omit this variable. 
2. Reproduction Rate and the Transmission Rate 
The key parameter in modeling bioterrorism transmission is the 
number of individuals the first case—called the index case—infects.127 The 
reproduction rate, (R0), is sometimes referred to as the transmission rate 
and describes a disease’s tendency to spread. But because the reproduction 
rate “is a function of the contact rate between individuals, it can be affected 
by changes in the environment,”128 and hence varies from epidemic to 
epidemic.129 Consequently, mathematical models use the average number 
of new infections each case creates,130 a purely artificial number. For 
projecting smallpox, researchers used historical data and outbreaks in 
developing countries,131 which is likely irrelevant as well. Further, although 
the rate generally decreases after the first generation, models use a single 
reproduction rate throughout the epidemic, i.e., the same value is 
 
123. See Kaplan et al., supra note 84, at 1038 (discussing generally the factors that 
affect the spread of disease). 
124. See Pourbohloul et al., supra note 82, at 1249. 
125. See Philip S. Brachman, Epidemiology, in MEDICAL MICROBIOLOGY (Samuel Baron ed., 
4th ed. 1996) (defining pathogenicity). 
126. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Principles of Epidemiology in Public Health 
Practice, Third Edition: An Introduction to Applied Epidemiology and Biostatistics, 
CDC (May 18, 2012), 
https://www.cdc.gov/ophss/csels/dsepd/ss1978/lesson3/section2.html. 
127. Pourbohloul et al., supra note 82, at 1253 (“The epidemic potential of disease is 
commonly estimated by using the basic reproductive number R0, the number of 
secondary infections arising from a single infection in a relatively naïve 
[susceptible or unvaccinated] population.”). 
128. Milton, supra note 90. 
129. Enserink, supra note 85, at 1592. 
130. Id. at 1593. 
131. See, e.g., Raymond Gani & Steve Leach, Transmission Potential of Smallpox in 
Contemporary Populations, 414 NATURE 748, 748 (2001); Richard Harling et al., 
Interim smallpox guidelines for the United Kingdom: Developing new policies from 
old evidence, 325 BRITISH MED. J. 1371, 1371 (2002) (“[T]he underlying evidence 
relies on historical data, which were collected in a different, now outdated context 
and are often incomplete.”). 
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artificially used in each generations of spread.132 This is not how Mother 
Nature works and, I suggest, is the single most significant cause of model 
failure. 
The reproduction rate is also a function of the virus’s transmission 
characteristics, and the nature and number of human interactions.133 In the 
context of smallpox, “researchers can’t agree on the right value. Past 
outbreaks yielded varying results, and the number can differ from 
population to population.”134 As one group of researchers noted, “models 
must balance biological realism against limitations of knowledge, and 
uncertainties need to be accurately communicated to policy-makers.”135 
Another group of researches notes that “[s]mallpox poses the particular 
challenge that key biological, social, and spatial factors affecting disease 
spread in contemporary populations must be elucidated largely from 
historical studies undertaken before disease eradication in 1979.”136 
Notwithstanding variability in reproduction rates from a theoretical 
and historical perspective, bioapocalyptic reproduction rates are commonly 
used in epidemic planning.137 DW assumed a replication rate of ten;138 an 
assumption which was seriously contested as a replication rate of two is 
considered more representative of actual past epidemics.139 Interestingly, 
concocting an epidemic model with a replication rate of ten for every 
generation creates a geometric increase in spread, further artificially—and 
exponentially—inflating the predictions.140 
 
132. See Kaplan et al., supra note 84, at 1039. 
133. Pourbohloul et al., supra note 82, at 1255. 
134. Enserink, supra note 85, at 1593. 
135. Milton, supra note 90 (“Infectious disease modeling plays an important role in this 
dialogue, and the biology of the transmission pathway, the focus of this review, is 
critical to producing appropriate predictive models and understanding which 
controls will work best under varying conditions.”). 
136. Ferguson et al., supra note 91. 
137. Eichner & Dietz, supra note 73, at 116 (agreeing with Fenner that the threat of a 
bioterrorist attack using smallpox should not be exaggerated). 
138. O’Toole et al., supra note 104, at 975. 
139. Enserink, supra note 85, at 1593 (“The most contested assumption in Dark Winter, 
however, is the [replication rate] for smallpox . . . .A team led by CDC’s Martin 
Meltzer . . . concluded after a similar analysis of many more past outbreaks that 
the average rate of transmission was lower than 2.”); see also Bozette et al., supra 
note 50, at 417, 419 (describing other models that estimate that the second-
generation attack rate was even lower, at 1.8, “with fewer than two second-
generation cases” and estimating these data from “the average number of next-
generation cases of smallpox arising from the current generation of cases” in 
twenty-five reported post-WWII outbreaks.). 
140. Id. (“When [the reproductive number] is high—say 10 to 13, as for measles—a 
disease will spread exponentially; when it’s between 1 and 2, it will just keep 
going, and below 1, it will peter out.”). 
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3. Transmission Potential and Susceptibility 
While the reproduction rate reflects the number of people each case 
infects, the transmission potential tells us the number of people each case 
is capable of infecting. This figure includes the length of time (“duration”) 
an infected person is in proximity to a potential victim enabling sufficient 
exposure and the proximity of contact.141 Most smallpox infections result 
from close contact, usually two meters or less, with infected individuals for 
several hours.142 And historical data attests to the fact that household 
members and hospital contacts are by far at the highest risk for infection.143 
An infected person’s mobility also impacts the number of people with 
whom he or she comes in contact and is thus able to infect. A very sick 
person confined to bed is not likely to have as many contacts as some of 
the forecasters would have us expect. Extrinsic factors such as weather, 
cultural factors such as social gatherings, and even regulated conduct such 
as traffic light timings all affect duration of exposure—and hence 
transmission capacity. 
Of course, if transmission can be airborne, the attack rate is multiplied 
because person-to-person contact is no longer necessary. For this reason, 
multiple attempts to weaponize the smallpox virus into an aerosolized 
version have been undertaken.144 To date, it appears that all attempts have 
failed.145 
4. Generations of Transmission and Case-Fatality Rate 
The number of generations of transmission—how many times the virus 
can be spread from one person to the next before the virus is no longer 
transmissible—is a crucial factor in modeling.146 Another model parameter 
 
141. Kaplan et al., supra note 84; R. H. Henderson & M. Yekpe, 90 Smallpox 
transmission in Southern Dahomey. A study of a village outbreak, AM.. J. EPID. 423 
(1969) (“The observed behavior of smallpox in this outbreak suggests that 
transmission occurring from casual contact is a rare event.”); Milton, supra note 
90, at 5 (“Susceptible individuals . . . would have needed to spend between 1.7 
and 16.7 hours in the patient’s room to have a 63% probability of becoming 
infected.”). 
142. Enserink, supra note 85, at 1593. 
143. Andrea Ammon et al., Early Disease Management Strategies in Case of a 
Smallpox Outbreak, in POXVIRUSES 414 (Andrew Mercer et al. eds., 2007) (“The 
European outbreaks between 1950 and 1971 showed that 55% of the infected 
persons contracted smallpox at a hospital, 20% in the family, 14% at their working 
place or school and 3% of the infected persons were working in a laundry, while 
8% were unidentified contacts.”). 
144. Jahrling, supra note 7, at 1. 
145. See, e.g., id. at 2 (showing that Jahrling tried to infect monkeys with smallpox and 
was only successful when the monkeys were both injected with the virus at high 
concentrations and subjected to aerosolized virus). 
146. See generally Nicholas C. Grassly & Christophe Fraser, Mathematical models of 
infectious disease transmission, 6 Nature Reviews Microbiology 477, 484 (2008) 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
Weapons of Mass Hysteria, Faulty Biothreat Predictions, and Their Impact on 
National (In)Security: A Case-Study of Smallpox 
371 
is the case-fatality rate—the percentage of infected people who die—which 
is a function of the virus’s lethality, the victim’s susceptibility and medical 
care rendered. 147 
Counter-intuitively, case-fatality rate appears to be indirectly 
proportional to generational duration; the faster the virus kills off its host 
population, the fewer susceptible members of the population there are left 
to infect. Once the virus runs out of susceptible members of the population, 
it loses the ability to transfer to other hosts,148 as smallpox needs a human 
host reservoir to remain viable; smallpox has no known animal reservoir, 
and unlike bacteria, cannot form spores to preserve itself for “better times.” 
Epidemiologists have calculated that smallpox’s continued spread requires 
a population of around two-hundred thousand people living within 
fourteen days of travel from each other.149 Without this feeding ground, the 
virus cannot continue its life cycle and dies out.150 
The 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic is illustrative of this counter-
intuitive concept. The virus was successful due to its extremely low 
lethality; its case-fatality rate was only 2.5 percent.151 However, its infection 
rate was the highest in modern history, with 500 million infections 
worldwide—about a third of the world’s population.152 But because the 
Spanish flu does not kill most of those it infects, a large number of infected 
people are available to spread the disease to others over multiple 
generations.153 (Think of making a one-dollar profit from one million people 
to making a thousand-dollar profit from ten.) This feature helps explain why 
 
(explaining that viruses can essentially run out of susceptible individuals, making 
the number of generations an important factor in modeling epidemics). 
147. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PRINCIPLES OF EPIDEMIOLOGY IN PUBLIC HEALTH 
PRACTICE 3-8 (3d ed. 2012). 
148. Henderson and Yekpe, supra note 141. 
149. RICHARD PRESTON, THE DEMON IN THE FREEZER 66 (2002). Compare D. A. Henderson, 
Smallpox, in CONSIDERATIONS FOR VIRAL DISEASE ERADICATION: LESSONS LEARNED AND 
FUTURE STRATEGIES: WORKSHOP SUMMARY (Stacey Knobler et al. eds., 2002), with 
Stephen L. Cochi et al., The Next Target After Polio: Global Eradication of 
Measles, in CONSIDERATIONS FOR VIRAL DISEASE ERADICATION: LESSONS LEARNED AND 
FUTURE STRATEGIES: WORKSHOP SUMMARY (Stacey Knobler et al. eds., 2002) 
(“Mathematical models and measles epidemiology studies in island 
populations have estimated that sustained transmission of measles requires 
a threshold population of at least several hundred thousand.” ). 
150. Id. See also FRANK FENNER ET AL., SMALLPOX AND ITS ERADICATION 192 (1988) (“It seems 
likely that a disease as lethal as smallpox must have exerted some selection for 
more resistant genotypes within populations in which it had been endemic.”). 
151. Jeffery K. Taubenberger & David M. Morens, 1918 Influenza: The Mother of All 
Pandemics, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 15, 15 (Jan. 2006). 
152. Id. 
153. See id. (stating that the Spanish flu killed an estimated fifty million people). 
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Ebola, with its high case-fatality rate, petered out far sooner than expected; 
it simply exhausted all susceptible hosts in the feasible transmission area. 
5. Extrinsic Factors and Secular Trends 
Finally, a disease’s incidence is dependent on genetics,154 nutrition,155 
and even weather.156 The weather not only influences the agent’s longevity, 
but also contact frequency between carriers and potential patients.157 
To illustrate, as noted earlier the DW attack was planned to occur in 
early December, 2002, originating in Oklahoma City.158 Theoretically, this 
would be an optimum time for a bio-terrorist smallpox attack; the virus 
loves cold and dry weather.159 The fable’s creators, nor any would-be 
terrorist, could not possibly have known at the time the program was run 
that, in early December, 2002, an ice and snow storm would virtually shut 
Oklahoma City down.160 On December 3, 2002, icy winds “left a damage 
footprint in a narrow band from west central to north central Oklahoma. 
Areas north of the icing region generally received 2-6 inches of snow, with 
some areas reporting more than eight inches.”161 The south sustained 
moderate to heavy rainfall, but the storm caused major damage to the 
electrical distribution systems throughout Oklahoma City.162 Had a real 
terrorist attack been orchestrated for early December in Oklahoma City, it 
would have flubbed dramatically; 163 the virus would have died quickly, 
because people would not have ventured from their houses, thus impeding 
the imagined explosive spread. 
The unpredictability of weather, a critical factor in transmission and 
epidemic success, makes bioterrorism a poor-choice of weapon for cash-
strapped terrorists. With no guarantee that the attack can achieve even a 
modicum of success, why would a terrorist group expend huge sums of 
 
154. Eichner & Dietz, supra note 73; FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 195. 
155. Ian Roberts, Biological warfare and the people of Iraq, 32 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 660, 
660 (2003). 
156. Jonathan A. Patz et al., The Effects of Changing Weather on Public Health, 21 
ANNUAL REV. PUB. HEALTH 271, 271 (2000) (“Many diseases are influenced by 
weather conditions.”). 
157. Enserink, supra note 85, at 1593. 
158. O’Toole et al., supra note 104. 
159. Henderson et al., supra note 3. 




163. See, e.g., Oklahoma Ice Storms, 2000-2007, OKLAHOMAN (Jan. 25, 2009, 12:00 AM), 
http://newsok.com/article/3340695 (documenting weather that would have 
theoretically scuttled the effectiveness of any attack). 
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capital to create a bioweapon, cultivate the bacteria, create a deployment 
system, and protect themselves only to see the anticipated event fizzle out 
because of rain or snow. 
IV. Truth? or Consequences 
A. A Statistical Summary of Post-World War II Epidemics 
I suggest governments reevaluate policies that use simple non-real-
time mathematical models for pandemic projections. To illustrate the flaws 
in current policies, I detail below stark statistical data.164 Then, as a case-
study, I investigate what actually happened in smallpox epidemics post-
World War II (“WWII”) to contrast reality and history with DW’s projections 
and government assumptions based thereon. 165 
Frank Fenner’s work provides a comprehensive review of smallpox 
epidemics sequestered by time period;166 other works provide additional 
detail. From 1959 on, Fenner tallied thirty-four European smallpox 
epidemics and concluded that all these outbreaks together resulted in only 
573 cases over the next thirty years.167 Many outbreaks consisted of a single 
case. Two-thirds of outbreaks led to no more than five cases.168 Fenner also 
states that most post-1959 outbreaks—including those in Western, Central 
and Eastern Africa and Indonesia—were associated with case-fatality rates 
in the range of five percent to fifteen percent.169 
Mack identifies an additional fifteen smallpox epidemics in Europe 
between 1950 and 1971, and tallied 936 confirmed cases, amounting to 
fewer than twenty cases per year, with a case-fatality rate of sixteen 
percent.170 He also calculated that these outbreaks gave rise to, on average, 
“1.6 cases from the general public and 2.4 cases from hospital contacts,”171 
and that in only two of these outbreaks were there more than two deaths—
and these occurred in hospital settings. He also noted that eighty-four 
 
164. See D.J. Muscatello et al., Translation of Real-Time Infectious Disease Modeling 
into Routine Public Health Practice, 23 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES e1 (2017) 
(providing a more up to date assessment of how the tool can be better used – 
incorporating real time data). 
165. Which coincidentally also heralds the inception of mass use of antibiotics. 
166. FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1070. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 1073. 
169. See, e.g., id. at 4, 327, 1070 (showing that case-fatality rates varied substantially 
by country, though whether due to hardiness of the strain or the population’s 
genetics or both is difficult to gauge, and that in post-WWII Spain and Portugal, 
“the overall case-fatality rate was only 3.1%”). 
170. Thomas M. Mack, Smallpox in Europe, 1950-1971, 125 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 161, 
163, 165 (1972). 
171. Id. at 163. 
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percent of those infected had never been successfully vaccinated. Three-
quarters of the outbreaks lasted no longer than two generations.172 The 
longest epidemics were caused by the weaker variola minor,173 
corroborating the counterintuitive view that the more lethal a microbe is, 
the shorter the epidemic, and sustaining the converse: the less severe the 
strain, the longer the epidemic. 
Mack also found that delays in diagnosis, ranging from one to twenty 
missed case identifications, occurred because European physicians lacked 
familiarity with the clinical features of smallpox. Nevertheless, he notes that 
this factor did not result in more spread or longer generations of 
transmission.174 To the contrary, “the larger the unrecognized generation 
(the more prominent was the spread of the disease in hospitals) the fewer 
additional generations occurred.”175 
Bhatnagar et al. performed another detailed analysis, studying fifty-one 
post-WWII outbreaks, identified from 1389 publications. The group found 
that 
[t]he median initial reproduction rate (R) across all 51 outbreaks was 
2 with a range of 0 to 38. About half had an initial R of 1 or less, and 
over two-thirds had an initial R of 3 or less. The median duration, as 
measured by number of generations, was 1 with a range of 0 to 9. 
About a third did not extend beyond the index generation, and nearly 
three quarters lasted for 3 or fewer generations. The median 
outbreak size, as measured by the total number of cases, was 4 with 
a range of 1 to 134 cases. About half involved 3 or fewer cases, and 
two-thirds involved 15 or fewer cases. The median number of deaths 
was 1 with a range of 0 to 26. About two-fifths involved no deaths, 
and three quarters involved 3 or fewer deaths.176 
Bhatnagar’s findings discredit the high replication rates DW used,177 which 
were based on epidemics where the disease was endemic, and modern 
health practices are non-existent. In fact, the Bhatnagar group specifically 
did not examine data from nineteenth-century European smallpox 
outbreaks because the group assessed these were inapplicable to modern 
times; i.e., the replication rate prior to 1945 was significantly higher than it 
would be today due to modern medical practice, and hence irrelevant to 
 
172. See id. 
173. Id. at 163, 166. 
174. See id. at 163. 
175. Id. at 163. 
176. Vibha Bhatnagar et al., Transmission patterns of smallpox: systematic review of 
natural outbreaks in Europe and North America since World War II, 6 BMC PUB. 
HEALTH 1, 4 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 
177. See id. at 4. 
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modeling a modern epidemic.178 Bhatnagar’s projected replication rates, as 
are Meltzer’s, are vastly incongruous with—and substantially lower than—
DW’s.179 
Specifically, Fenner, among the leading authorities on smallpox, 
unequivocally refuted DW’s outcomes, stating that 
[t]he comparatively slow spread of smallpox[ ] . . . is attributed to the 
fact that infection is almost invariably transmitted during face-to-face 
contact with a patient after the rash has begun to develop. Patients 
with classical smallpox, unmodified by vaccination, are usually 
confined to bed during this period and are therefore not normally in 
contact with many susceptible persons. While previously vaccinated 
persons may experience a very mild, highly modified form of 
smallpox and remain ambulatory, such persons excrete fewer 
organisms and are less efficient transmitters of infection.180 
B. Research Plan and Methodology 
For some reason, the data set forth in the studies described above do 
not etch themselves into the collective consciousness of policymakers. For 
example, an Israeli governmental body conducted a study for the purposes 
of developing policy and literally lifted assumptions from DW or used 
tertiary references cited therein,181 completely ignoring Fenner, Mack, 
 
178. See id. (“The recent literature contains several estimates for the reproductive rate 
of smallpox . . . Two of the studies do not use contemporary western outbreaks. 
One estimates the basic reproductive rate, (R0, a theoretical parameter defined as 
the expected number of new infected hosts that an infectious host will 
produce . . . rather than effective reproduction rate.”); see also Eichner & Dietz, 
supra note 73, at 110-117 (estimating the maximum likelihood of the spread of 
smallpox in a 1967 epidemic in Abakaliki, Nigeria, in a group that refused 
vaccination and finding that their “results support the widely held belief that 
smallpox spreads slowly, mainly among close contacts, and that infectivity before 
the onset of rash was negligible.”).  
179. See generally Bhatnagar et al., supra note 176 (describing the various reproductive 
rates in epidemics she studied, none of which support DW’s projections). 
180. P. F. Wehrle et al., An Airborne Outbreak of Smallpox in a German Hospital and its 
Significance with Respect to Other Recent Outbreaks in Europe, 43 BULL. WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. 669, 677 (1970) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (writing with 
D.A. Henderson). 
181. Paul E. Slater et al., Preparation for an Outbreak of Smallpox in Israel, 4 ISRAEL MED. 
ASSOC. J. 508, 508 (July 2002) (“In an uncontrolled smallpox outbreak, one 
contagious case typically generates 10–20 secondary cases—a community 
transmission potential almost as high as that of measles and chickenpox. The 
secondary attack rate in susceptible household members is 50%. As in most 
infectious diseases, lighter cases of smallpox may be the most dangerous 
transmitters because the victims will be ambulatory for longer and will have many 
more contacts than those cases that result in early collapse.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
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Meltzer, Bhatnagar and other world-class scientists’ compelling and 
competing data. 
Notwithstanding the multiple studies corroborating Fenner’s view, 
DW’s extreme and hysteria-laden assertions are repeated and ingrained 
into the collective societal psyche, not just by the popular press, but by 
scientists—a question that begs for investigation, understanding and a 
“setting straight” of the record—and by prominent influence makers.182 
I suggest that the mindless repetition of DW’s erroneous assumptions 
occurs because the DW fable resulted from “poetic failure,”183 causing an 
emotional entanglement in its viewers and readers with which statistical 
data in scholarly articles cannot compete. It may be that statistical evidence 
is ineffective in achieving much-needed policy change regarding biothreat 
modeling and response because it “can’t get the message out” to non-
scientists. The DW episode also falsely portrays the exigencies of modern 
life—air travel, increased susceptibility to smallpox, and vaccine 
shortages—as new, epidemic-provocative issues, leading to the false 
conclusion that epidemics of the last century offer no guide or insights that 
could be helpful in planning a potential terrorist attack. 
Parenthetically this approach suggests that a story format or narrative 
may be more appropriate to policy planning by the lay policy-maker. To 
effectuate this alternative approach of reviewing post-WWII smallpox 
epidemics in industrialized countries via a real life review, I reviewed all 
accessible historical records from these outbreaks, focusing on facts not 
commonly cited. 
C. Factors of Concern 
For ease of reference I reiterate DW’s key assumptions from which 
apocalyptic predictions derive: (1) because modern doctors are unfamiliar 
with smallpox, diagnosis would be delayed, allowing missed cases to infect 
others; (2) today’s population is largely unvaccinated and therefore more 
susceptible to infection; (3) increased air travel will disseminate smallpox 
faster, making tracing difficult; (4) smallpox is highly infective, more so than 
common diseases such as flu and measles; (5) airborne transmission is a 
viable means of infecting large populations with a viral disease; (6) there 
will be at least four generations of spread; (7) the replication rate will be 
ten to twenty throughout the four generations of spread; (8) the case-
 
182. See, e.g., Perring, supra note 47 (noting even the well-respected Bill Gates 
promulgates DW’s false assertions). 
183. Shulamit Almog, Creating Representations of Justice in the Third Millenium: Legal 
Poetics in Digital Times, 31 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 183, 211 (2006) (defining 
poetic failure and explaining that “even a poetically flawless articulation might fail 
to convey its intended meaning because of the addressee’s inability to receive 
it.”). 
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fatality rate will be thirty percent;184 (9) there will be an insufficient supply 
of vaccine for mass vaccination, the preferred means of response, leading 
to mass hysteria; and (10) it will take three or more weeks to get enough 
vaccine.185 
V. The Case-Studies 
A. New York City in 1947: The Vaccine-Shortage Scenario 
The New York City (“NYC”) epidemic began in 1947 when an expatriate 
named Eugene LeBar brought smallpox from Mexico to NYC.186 This incident 
occurred seventy years ago, but embodies many of the nightmare features 
of an imagined bioterrorist attack: NYC physicians were unfamiliar with 
smallpox, clinical and laboratory diagnosis were delayed, the index case 
traveled thousands of miles while infected, and the exposed population was 
largely unvaccinated.187 
On February 24, 1947, Mr. LeBar, a forty-seven-year-old rug merchant 
living in Mexico embarked on a bus trip to New York with his wife.188 That 
evening he suffered a headache and complained of a backache and two 
days later, en route, he developed a fine rash.189 The disease is transmissible 
once a rash becomes visible, and from this point on it is virtually certain he 
exposed others.190 
Over its six-day trip, the bus on which LeBar traveled stopped in seven 
major population centers: Monterrey, Mexico; Laredo, Texas; Dallas, Texas; 
St. Louis, Missouri; Cincinnati, Ohio; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, culminating 
 
184. Enserink, supra note 85 (asserting that “O’Toole and her co-authors selected six 
[largely unidentified] smallpox importations into Europe after World War II that 
they thought might be typical for a 20th century attack . . . They settled on a[ 
clearly unsubstantiated reproductive number] of 10—although they think that 
may be on the low side,” even though it proved to be notoriously on the high side 
and that “[i]n one famous and ‘particularly instructive’ case, they wrote in a paper, 
a patient who returned to Yugoslavia from a trip to Iraq in 1972 infected 11 others, 
who in turn caused 140 ‘second generation’ cases”); see also Donald A. 
Henderson, The Looming Threat of Bioterrorism, 283 SCIENCE 1279 (showing that 
Henderson, a consultant on DW embraced this assumption; in other papers, 
including in FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 4, which he co-authored, he supports 
a case-fatality rate as low as five percent.). 
185. O’Toole et al., supra note 104, at 973. 
186. See Israel Weinstein, An Outbreak of Smallpox in New York City, 37 AM. J. PUB. 




190. NEW YORK DEP’T HEATH, Smallpox Questions and Answers: The Disease and the 
Vaccine (Apr. 2003), https://www.health.ny.gov/publications/7004/ (“[T]he 
person becomes most contagious with the onset of rash.”) 
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in NYC.191 The bus passengers, in turn, dispersed to over twenty-nine states, 
exposing hundreds more.192 
The LeBars arrived in NYC six days after they left Mexico, checked into 
a hotel, did some sightseeing and walked through a large department store. 
By March 5, 1947, LeBar developed a fever, the rash had worsened, and he 
had become sick enough to be admitted to Bellevue Hospital.193 On March 
8, he was transferred to Willard Parker Hospital, a communicable-diseases 
hospital, where doctors ruled out smallpox because he claimed he was 
never exposed.194 He died two days later. An autopsy revealed hemorrhagic 
disease, the most dangerous and potentially contagious form of the 
disease, but the diagnosis was not made.195 Not until formal lab tests were 
returned several weeks later and the autopsy was re-evaluated was 
smallpox diagnosed—over a month after LeBar’s arrival in NYC.196 
Between LeBar’s arrival in NYC on March 1 and his hospitalization on 
March 6, he had direct contact with hundreds of people, plus potentially 
exposing three thousand additional guests staying at his hotel.197 
Eventually, all of LeBar’s direct and indirect contacts were located and 
vaccinated; some were sequestered to prevent further spread;198 some 
were located as late as April 4, 1947, nearly a month after he arrived.199 
None of LeBar’s direct contacts developed smallpox.200 A few weeks after 
LeBar’s death, however, two patients who had been hospitalized at Willard 
Parker at the same time as LeBar were diagnosed with smallpox—a baby 
with croup and a hospital worker admitted for mumps.201 Only after these 
diagnoses were made and LeBar’s autopsy results were re-evaluated did the 
 
191. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 1378. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 1376. 
194. Id. 
195. Daniel Okrent, Daniel Okrent on the 1940s, The War, and the Great Smallpox 
Immunization of New York, VANITY FAIR, (Oct. 2013), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2013/10/daniel-okrent-on-the-1940s (“It 
took until the morning of April 4 for health officials to determine the cause of 
death: smallpox. New York had recorded only nine instances of the disease in the 
previous 25 years, none at all in the previous 8.”). 
196. Id.; see also Berton Roueché, The Case of the Man from Mexico, NEW YORKER (June 
11, 1949), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1949/06/11/the-case-of-the-
man-from-mexico. 
197. Okrent, supra note 195. 
198. Roueché, supra note 196, at 70. 
199. Okrent, supra note 195. 
200. The Smallpox Scare, TIME (Apr. 28, 1947), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,793578,00.html. 
201. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 1379. 
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hospital vaccinate its staff and notify the NYC Health Department and the 
U.S. Public Health Service. (“USPHS”).202 
At this point, the USPHS notified the bus passengers’ ultimate 
destination cities (all 29 of them) along with every passenger on board the 
bus and advised them to get vaccinated. Given the seven to seventeen-day 
incubation period, it would be safe to assume by the time LeBar’s contacts 
were identified, if they had sufficient exposure, they would have already 
fallen ill. None did. 
The hospital worker LeBar infected later infected his wife and three 
other patients. One patient was a young boy treated for whooping cough 
who was diagnosed on March 17.203 The second patient, a baby, did not 
infect anyone, not even her parents.204 The third patient was discharged to 
a convalescent nursing facility before he was diagnosed. There he infected 
three others, two children and a sixty-two-year-old nun.205 Though neither 
patient had direct contact with LeBar, the hospital does not appear to have 
considered the possibility of airborne transmission; instead, doctors seem 
to have assumed it was transmitted via intermediary contact.206 
Mirroring current concerns, “[f]ew physicians in the city had ever seen 
smallpox, either on a microscope slide or in the appearance of its 
murderous excrescences on a doomed victim.”207 As a result, “[d]efinitive 
diagnosis had had to wait until laboratory studies could be conducted in 
Washington” about a month later.208 
Once LeBar’s diagnosis was confirmed, NYC’s mayor, William O’Dwyer, 
announced plans to vaccinate everyone in the city.209 Vaccine shortage was 
an initial concern; the Health Department had 250,000 doses of vaccine that 
could be immediately distributed and 400,000 doses that were not yet 
 
202. Id.; see also Roueche, supra note 196, at 70. 
203. See Smallpox Strikes Seaman from Here—Mess Steward Removed from an Army 
Transport to a Hospital in Germany. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1947, at 13 (noting that 
two additional cases of smallpox were transmitted in the New York City area at 
that same time—a merchant seaman who temporarily lived with relatives in 
Manhattan from March 4 to 15, and R.C. Smith, who lived in Trenton, N.J. and died 
nearby in Camden, on April 17, 1947; neither had known contact with Le Bar or 
any cases traced to him). 
204. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 1379. 
205. Id. at 1379. 
206. Jerry Oppenheimer, The Panic of 1947, DAILY BEAST (Sept. 19, 2009, at 3:10 PM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2009/09/19/the-panic-of-1947.html; cf. 
Wehrle et al., supra note 180 (assuming that airborne transmission occurred 
without considering the possibility of intermediary contact as a source of 
infection). 
207. Okrent, supra note 195. 
208. Id. 
209. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 1381. 
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ready for use.210 The Army and Navy sent 780,000 doses from all over the 
country.211 Within a week, “despite a shortage of vaccine, more than 
2,500,000 of the city’s 7,500,000 had been vaccinated;”212 by months’ end 
over six million people were vaccinated.213 While some question these 
figures on the basis of vaccine availability,214 O’Dwyer had presciently 
received a commitment from several vaccine companies to provide nearly 
six million doses of smallpox vaccine and the Health Commissioner had put 
in place the mechanics of implementation.215 
The Health Department had “organized a corps of employees: 1,100 
outside physicians, 242 clerks, and 3,000 civilian volunteers to vaccinate city 
residents [and] police were assigned to supervise the snaking lines of 
people waiting to be vaccinated at clinics around the city.”216 NYC residents 
did not become hysterical as DW might have prophesized; Time Magazine 
notes that Manhattan residents were calm, “queu[ing] up by the thousands, 
sometimes in lines five blocks long[] for vaccination.”217 Still the public 
stayed calm. 
The Health Commissioner, Israel Weinstein, took to the radio to 
encourage vaccination in a model example of how to convey information 
without creating hysteria.218 Even when the media published fear-
mongering articles and when “at the height of the program[] the vaccine 
 
210. Pascal James Imperato, Reflections on New York City’s 1947 Smallpox Vaccination 
Program and Its 1976 Swine Influenza Immunization Program, 40 J. CMTY. HEALTH 
581, 587 (2015). 
211. Okrent, supra note 195. 
212. The Smallpox Scare, supra note 200. 
213. Roueché, supra 196 (“Within the space of 28 days a total of at least six million 
three hundred and fifty thousand people had been vaccinated in the city.”); 
Weinstein, supra note 186, at 1381. 
214. DAVID L. STREINER ET AL., PDQ PUBLIC HEALTH 202 (2011). 
215. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 1381. 
216. N.Y. CITY DEPT. HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH IN NEW YORK CITY: 
200 YEARS OF LEADERSHIP 43 (2005) [hereinafter 200 Years of Leadership]. 
217. The Smallpox Scare, supra note 200; see also Dr. Israel Weinstein Smallpox 
Message, WNYC, archive id: 69299, http://www.wnyc.org/story/dr-israel-
weinstein-smallpox-message/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (providing a picture 
captioned: “April 14, 1947- Long line winds up to and around Morrisania Hospital, 
167th Street and Gerard Avenue in the Bronx, as thousands await turn to be 
innoculated against smallpox (spelling and grammar errors in original caption)). 
The picture depicted the essence of calm. See Barbara P. Billauer, Weapons of 
Mass Hysteria (WMH), Faulty Bio-Threat Predictions and its Impact on National 
(In) Security, SSRN (Mar. 19, 2016) (SSRN 2749658), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2749658.   
218. Israel Weinstein, Commissioner, New York City Health Department, Dr. Israel 
Weinstein Smallpox Message (Apr. 4, 1947), available at 
http://www.wnyc.org/story/dr-israel-weinstein-smallpox-message/. 
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supply vanished,”219 the havoc DW predicts never materialized.220 Perhaps 
it was because O’Dwyer downplayed the risk of waiting until more vaccine 
arrived.221 Perhaps it was because Weinstein’s radio announcements 
successfully dampened hysteria.222 Or perhaps DW exaggerates the 
likelihood of a hysterical reaction?223 
By May 3, 1947, all NYC vaccine clinics had closed and the outbreak was 
deemed contained.224 Only twelve people had contracted smallpox and only 
two had died.225 At least three people died from the vaccine.226 Three more 
people died of direct, vaccine-related complications, including septicemia 
and generalized vaccinia;227 and at least six more probably died of vaccine-
 
219. Id. (“In the 1947 campaign, trouble began on April 16, when (no longer on page 
1), the Times announced, ‘Vaccinations Stop; Drug Supply Gone; Thousands 
Turned Away’. With little warning, and at the height of the program, the vaccine 
supply vanished, something that was never explained . . . . During the shortage, 
the Times noted, “hundreds of eager men, women, and children queued up at 
Bellevue Hospital at dawn, although vaccinations were not scheduled to begin 
until 10 a.m. At some stations, the crowds did not take kindly to the news that the 
doctors had run out of vaccine and the police had a little difficulty dispersing a 
crowd of several hundred” outside one vaccine station.”); see also Dale Smith, 
Let’s make new mistakes: planning for public health and civil defense, in 
BIOTERRORISM: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH INTERVENTIONS 30 (Robert J. Ursano 
eds., 2004) (describing a situation in which panic did break out in neighboring 
states, serving as a point of comparison to New York City’s handling of the 
outbreak without any panic. But even with a seemingly calm public in NYC, the 
next day a million doses arrived, and 500,000 more people were vaccinated.). 
220. Kent A. Sepkowitz, Letter to the Editor, The 1947 Smallpox Vaccination Campaign 
in New York City, Revisited, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 960, 960 (2004) 
(showing that on April 16, 1947 the New York Times ran the headline 
“Vaccinations Stop; Drug Supply Gone; Thousands Turned Away.”) 
221. See Dale Smith, Let’s make new mistakes: planning for public health and civil 
defense, in BIOTERRORISM: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH INTERVENTIONS 30 (Robert J. 
Ursano eds., 2004) (noting that when “[a] man died of smallpox in Camden, New 
Jersey . . . panic broke out in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and southern New Jersey[,]” 
perhaps indicating that New York City was indeed doing something right). 
221. Sepkowitz, supra note 220, at 960. 
221. 200 Years of Leadership, supra note 216, at 43. 
222. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 1381-82. 
223. See Smith, supra note 221, at 30 (describing a situation in which panic did break 
out and serving as a point of comparison to New York City’s handling of the 
outbreak without any panic, suggesting that perhaps New York City’s outbreak 
management was indeed done correctly). 
224. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 1381. 
225. Id. at 1382, 1379. 
226. Id. at 1379. 
227. Id. at 1383-84. 
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related encephalitis.228 The epidemic extended over two generations with a 
replication rate of 2.75,229 and a case-fatality rate of sixteen percent.230 
Even though LeBar contracted the most virulent form of smallpox, the 
hemmorhagic type, the attack rate was miniscule. Especially considering 
that he came into direct contact with hundreds of people, from hospital 
personnel who were exposed to him for long periods of time, to transient 
meetings with tourists and hotel guests, to intermediate exposures to 
fellow bus travelers. Even with factors primed to generate explosive spread 
and legitimize bioapocalyptic predictions, calamity was averted. Long 
before social media existed to get the word out, nearly six million people 
were vaccinated in a month.231 In the face of the unknown, an untried 
health department’s prompt and efficient response actions resulted in 
rapid containment of the disease as well as prevention of hysteria. 
B. Bradford, England, in 1961-62: High Case-Fatality Rate 
The worst of the modern outbreaks in terms of case-fatality rate 
occurred in Bradford, England, in 1962, with a rate of forty-two percent!232 
This case presents another example of a potential nightmare scenario that 
failed to generate the anticipated mass epidemic. Like the NYC outbreak, 
the Bradford outbreak involved the dangerous hemorrhagic form of 
smallpox.233 A large proportion of the hospital staff was unvaccinated; the 
smallpox diagnosis was difficult given the hospital staff’s lack of experience 
with the disease—and hence not timely made.234 Even after the index case 
died and her body was flown back to Pakistan for burial, physicians did not 
 
228. Id. at 1383 (Some 46 cases of encephalitis were reported in the month following 
the mass vaccinations; eight died. Encephalitis has several causes- including 
smallpox vaccination. Vaccine causation could be ruled out in only two of the 
deaths. Six cases were equivocal. Notwithstanding, they were not considered as 
associated with the vaccine because “the Health Department has had no proof of 
any death due to post-vaccinal encephalitis in its vaccination campaign.” Id. While 
epidemiology in 1947 was not as robust as it is now, one would be hard pressed 
to believe that New York City normally reported a monthly background level of six 
encephalitis deaths and 44 encephalitis cases with could not otherwise be 
accounted for.). 
229. Id. (providing that the index case infected two people and that the three-person 
second generation infected eight people, leading to an average replication rate of 
2.75); cf. O’Toole, supra note 104 (projecting a replication rate of ten). 
230. Id. (showing that two of twelve people died, resulting in a fatality rate of 16.6 
percent). 
231. STREINER ET AL., supra note 214. 
232. Derrick Tovey, The Bradford smallpox outbreak in 1962: A personal account, 97 J. 
ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 244, 246 (2004) (showing 14 cases of smallpox resulting in 7 
deaths, one of which is attributed to cerebral thrombosis). 
233. E.C. Benn, Smallpox in Bradford 1962: A Clinical Review, 56 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 343, 
343 (1963). 
234. FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1079. 
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consider smallpox as the cause of death.235 The replication rate was 
astronomical; the index case infected ten others prior to the diagnosis—i.e., 
in the first generation.236 Yet, by the end of the epidemic, which lasted two 
generations, only fourteen people were infected and only six died from the 
disease.237 
A supervising pathologist later wrote that “if ever a smallpox epidemic 
arose again, it might well present itself to the clinicians not as a textbook 
case but as PUO [pustules of unknown origin] as in the Bradford outbreak 
or as a haematological disorder or some masking disease.”238 
The health authorities’ first inkling of disease occurred on December 
25, 1961, when a twenty-four-year-old man arrived at Heathrow Airport. 
Health authorities suspected he had smallpox, but physicians diagnosed ten 
more cases before they identified the index case—a nine-year-old Pakistani 
girl.239 The girl had been vaccinated on December 5, 1961, prior to departing 
Karachi, arriving in London by air eleven days later. After her arrival in 
London, she and her parents took a train to Bradford, England, arriving the 
next day.240 On December 23, 1961, she was admitted to Bradford 
Children’s Hospital and diagnosed with malaria.241 On December 27, her 
condition worsened. Three days later she developed facial lesions and died 
shortly thereafter.242 A post-mortem examination attributed her death to 
septicemia and malaria. At the time physicians did not suspect she had 
contracted smallpox.243 
Between January 11 and 13, 1962, physicians discovered ten first-
generation cases, each contracted in a hospital setting.244 Only three 
second-generation cases occurred, leading to a total of fourteen cases. 
 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 246. 
237. FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1079. See also Benn, supra note 233, at 343. 
238. Tovey, supra note 232, at 246 (Tovey, a physician on the scene, observed that 
physicians’ “immediate difficulty was that we would not be able to obtain 
laboratory confirmation of smallpox for at least 48 hours. At that time electron 
microscopy had not been established to obtain a speedy laboratory diagnosis. 
Specimens from the two deceased were dispatched by taxi to the local Public 
Health Laboratory where . . . the samples [were tested] by . . . complement 
fixation and egg culture. A quickly convened ‘council of war’ was held by the 
regional medical officer, the chief medical officer . . . , his deputy, the regional 
infectious diseases consultant[,] and myself.”). 
239. Id. at 245. 
240. FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1079. 
241. Benn, supra note 233, at 343. 
242. FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1079. 
243. Id. 
244. Tovey, supra note 232, at 245-46 (noting that the first-generation cases were a 
hospital visitor, a cook, a nurse, a pathologist, and six patients). 
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Seven patients died, six from smallpox, and the seventh from an unrelated 
cause.245 
Identifying, tracing, surveilling, and vaccinating the Pakistani child’s 
more than 1400 contacts was “expensive, difficult, and time-consuming.”246 
Although health authorities never contemplated country-wide mass 
vaccination, they opened vaccination clinics because so many people had 
been exposed to the disease.247 Health authorities also quarantined staff 
members from the four hospitals involved and surveilled nine hundred 
contacts.248 Nearly the entire population of Bradford—numbering nearly 
250,000—was vaccinated in five days.249 In a month, the outbreak was 
over.250 While six people died from the smallpox epidemic, vaccination 
complications were not de minimis.251 At least six people had post-vaccine 
symptoms requiring hospitalization, one adult died, and three children died 
of post-vaccinal encephalitis.252 
The mechanism through which smallpox spread remained unclear 
because no direct contact occurred between the index patient and those 
she infected.253 Despite this, health authorities discounted aerial spread.254 
Since the outbreak was already rather large by the time it was recognized, 
and there were numerous opportunities for transmission, both within the 
hospital and in the general community, health authorities concluded that 
an undiagnosed member of the medical or nursing staff likely transmitted 
the infection.255 
Many of DW’s assumptions matched the facts of Bradford, but DW’s 
projections did not materialize, most significantly because the anticipated 
replication rate existed only for the first generation; for the second, the 
 
245. Id. (finding that only twelve people became ill and only six died). 
246. FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1079. 
247. Id. 
248. John Douglas & William Edgar, Smallpox in Bradford, 1962, 1 BRITISH MED. J. 612, 
612 (1962) (noting that authors were, at the time, the Medical Officer of Health 
and Deputy Medical Officer of Health, respectively, of Bradford). 
249. FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1079. 
250. Tovey, supra note 232. 
251. Id., at 246 (noting that “[i]n 1960 in England and Wales 40,699 persons received 
vaccination, 8 developed encephalitis and 3 died.”). See also Benn, supra note 233, 
at 345. 
252. Benn, supra note 233, at 345. See also Tovey, supra note 232, at 246 (noting that 
“[one] child . . . had not been vaccinated because of an infected [diaper] rash, but 
had been bathed with her sister who had been vaccinated”). 
253. Douglas & Edgar, supra note 248, at 613. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
Weapons of Mass Hysteria, Faulty Biothreat Predictions, and Their Impact on 
National (In)Security: A Case-Study of Smallpox 
385 
replication rate dropped to 0.3,256 and after that, the epidemic died out, as 
do all epidemics with a replication rate less than one.257 
C. Canada in 1962: Limited Transnational Transmission 
Because international air traffic increased in the 1960s and 1970s, more 
people traveled to Canada and the United States from countries with 
indigenous smallpox than in previous years.258 It would be reasonable, then, 
to expect more international transmission into North America. However, 
the facts do not bear out this forecast.259 
On August 10, 1962, a fifteen-year-old Canadian boy and his missionary 
family left Brazil by air, arriving in NYC, a trip that would have taken at least 
ten hours.260 The boy was feverish and ill on embarkation.261 After a six-hour 
hiatus in NYC, the family boarded a train to Canada, arriving in Toronto two 
days later.262 Soon after their arrival, the boy developed the characteristic 
centrifugal rash, but the smallpox diagnosis was delayed until two days 
after he was hospitalized.263 
Authorities identified, vaccinated, and surveilled every passenger on 
the plane from Brazil to New York, as well as the members of his family and 
other known close contacts in Toronto.264 The media advised those who had 
traveled on the train from New York or been at the station to seek 
vaccination, and those who did so were placed under surveillance.265 No 
one contracted the disease from the boy.266 
D. Stockholm in 1963: Spread by Close Contact 
In 1963, sixteen years after NYC successfully dealt with its smallpox 
crisis and a year after the Bradford epidemic, a smallpox epidemic broke 
out in Stockholm.267 Health authorities did not recognize this outbreak until 
 
256. See FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1079 (indicating that there were three second-
generation cases infected by the ten first-generation cases). 
257. Id. (noting the pattern of a significant drop of replication rate after an initial peak 
in the first generation occurs in virtually every epidemic evaluated; when it 
reaches one, the epidemic dies out) 
258. FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1081. 
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long after its onset—after the index case became infectious and the seventh 
case was diagnosed, which was after the second generation had begun.268 
This case began with a twenty-four-year-old seaman returning to 
Sweden after a two-week sojourn in Australia.269 The young man left 
Darwin, Australia, on March 22, 1963, and arrived in Stockholm two days 
later.270 The initial leg of the flight stopped in five countries with layovers of 
fifty minutes or less: Jakarta, Indonesia; Singapore; Yangon, Myanmar; 
Calcutta, India; Karachi, Pakistan; Tehran, Iran; and Damascus, Syria, before 
arrival at its final destination—Zurich, Switzerland.271 Once in Zurich, the 
seaman spent the night in a hotel. The following day, March 24, he boarded 
a flight to Stockholm. On April 6, 1963, he developed a “moderate fever and 
a mild rash,” the first signs of transmissible infection. According to the CDC, 
he was infected en route, “either at a terminal or on the plane,” and it was 
presumed he acquired the disease while in transit throughout Southeast 
Asia.272 However, because the disease’s incubation period ranges from 
seven to seventeen days,273 it is possible the infection began before the 
seaman began his voyage. 
Once he fell ill, he remained at his grandmother’s house, where he 
infected her and three others with whom he had direct contact.274 The 
grandmother infected three more women, and two others infected their 
partners, beginning the second generation.275 Despite Sweden’s efforts to 
vaccinate all hospital personnel, eight hospital staff members and patients 
contracted smallpox,276 some of which occurred without direct contact, 
constituting the beginning of the second generation.277 The other cases 
contracted smallpox through face-to-face contact in the homes of 
patients.278 It is possible that a nurse who treated these patients and later 
became infected served as the intermediary for the third generation. The 
virus also spread from a patient’s laundry, and possibly “by remote airborne 
 




270. Id. (flying on BOAC Flight #709). 
271. Id. 
272. Id. 
273. WORLD HEALTH ORG., Frequently asked questions and answers on smallpox, (June 28, 
2016), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/smallpox/faq/en/. 
274. Stockholm CDC MMWR, supra note 267. 
275. Id. 
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exposure,”279 although the health department did not seriously consider 
the latter. 
One early case suffered an acute hemorrhagic form of the disease and 
died; the diagnosis was made post-mortem, leaving open the possibility 
that she exposed others.280 Another case involved a woman who shared an 
apartment with her daughter in a boarding house that housed one hundred 
people.281 The woman developed a rash, and the local hospital’s 
dermatology clinic evaluated her. Before a physician diagnosed her with 
smallpox, she had exposed at least 450 people; having spent four hours in 
the hospital in two crowded waiting rooms, and previously exposing all the 
women in the boarding house.282 The source of the woman’s smallpox was 
traced to her daughter, a mortician who had prepared a body from one of 
the epidemic cases.283 The CDC warned that these contacts “establishe[d] 
an additional large group of contacts in which cases may yet occur.”284 Yet 
none did. 
Approximately eight thousand people lived in the initial case’s 
neighborhood, and 300,000 people in Stockholm took advantage of the 
offered vaccine, suggesting that a huge number of people feared 
exposure.285 The CDC feared that the United States would be exposed, 
asserting that “at the time, there was justifiable concern about possible 
spread of infection from Sweden to the United States.”286 The fear was 
illusory. The disease did not spread beyond the locality. At the conclusion 
of the outbreak, only twenty-five people became ill, and only four had 
died.287 
In the Stockholm outbreak, there was again an asymmetrical and non-
redundant distribution of replication rates. The index case infected four 
others for a replication rate of four. The second generation infected seven 
others, indicating a replication rate of 1.75. The third generation bore a 
replication rate of two. The epidemic died out when the average replication 
rate would have been 2.58, confounding even conventional expectations. 
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conclusion of the outbreak, only twenty-five people became ill, and only 
four had died.289 
E. Germany in 1970: Airborne Transmission(?) 
The 1970 outbreak in Meschede, Germany, is the principal incident 
used to support the claim that airborne transmission of smallpox is 
possible.290 Airborne transmission would eliminate the need (time and 
proximity) for smallpox spread through direct person-to-person contact 
and could—theoretically—render smallpox into a realistic bioterrorist 
agent—if it is a realistic possibility.291 
The incident in Meschede began on December 31, 1969, during the 
peak of holiday traffic, when a man flew from Karachi, Pakistan, to 
Düsseldorf, Germany—at least an eleven-hour flight.292 From Dusseldorf, he 
took a three-hour train ride to his home in Meschede, arriving New Year’s 
Day. He had been vaccinated shortly before his arrival in Germany like the 
index cases in several of the previously discussed outbreaks. Ten days after 
his arrival, the young man developed a fever. Because his doctors suspected 
he had contracted typhoid, he was hospitalized in an infectious-disease 
isolation unit and confined to a private room on the ground floor. Four days 
later, on January 14, 1970, doctors noticed a rash.293 On January 16, 1970, 
he was diagnosed with smallpox.294 
Even though “the original smallpox patient had not left his room during 
his hospitalization, all hospital patients and personnel were immunized” 
and quarantined, although WHO actively discouraged Germany from 
mounting an intensive vaccination campaign.295 This feature suggests that 
public-health officials in Germany seriously believed that hospital personnel 
were at risk, even though at the same time they discounted anything but 
miniscule contact between hospital personnel and the index patient. At the 
 
289. Id. 
290. See generally Wehrle et al., supra note 180. 
291. See id. at 677 (“Extensive studies in both endemic and non-endemic countries 
have clearly indicated the necessity for close, and often prolonged, personal 
contact before transmission of infection occurs. A single patient rarely infects 
more than a few persons, and only infrequently have cases been reported in which 
there was no direct or ‘face-to-face’ contact with an earlier case.” Thus, “the 
Meschede outbreak in which the index patient infected 17 others is clearly an 
exception.”). 
292. Id. at 670. 
293. Id. 
294. Id. 
295. Id.; see also FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1072 (“Germany had considered mass 
vaccination . . . but had been persuaded by WHO not to implement this operation, 
on the grounds that it was unnecessary and would be costly and likely to result in 
many complications.”). 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
Weapons of Mass Hysteria, Faulty Biothreat Predictions, and Their Impact on 
National (In)Security: A Case-Study of Smallpox 
389 
inception of the outbreak no one considered the possibility that airborne 
transmission might have been involved. 
Following the diagnosis of smallpox, the building remained closed to 
visitors, after having been previously closed due to an influenza outbreak.296 
Paul Wehrle, a WHO researcher tasked with monitoring the smallpox 
outbreak in Germany, published a seminal report shortly after the epidemic 
ended. Wehrle did not arrive on the scene immediately and wrote the initial 
chronology from hearsay reports. However, it is possible he may not have 
fully understood due to his lack of expertise in the local language and 
missed significant clues negating airborne transmission, such as the 
likelihood the nurses and doctors who treated the index case transmitted 
the disease elsewhere, thereby serving as intermediaries to other 
patients.297  These concerns were never seriously investigated heretofore, 
as we shall see. Wehrle’s report notes that the index patient had direct 
contact with a single visitor who later contracted the disease, triggering the 
first generation of cases.298 This contention contradicts other reports that 
the visitor did not enter the patient-care areas nor the isolation unit 
corridor.299 It also fails to account for the fact that the night nurse had 
contact with the patient and could have transmitted smallpox to other 
wards, claiming her contact with the index patient was brief.300 Finally, 
Wehrle’s report omits discussing significant contacts with other nursing and 
medical personnel, which will be discussed infra. The index patient was 
responsible for sixteen additional cases on three floors of the hospital 
unit.301 
Because the WHO could not identify an obvious human or inanimate 
mechanism for spread, it assumed that air currents carried the virus.302 
Their assumption was based on a smoke test performed several months 
after the outbreak that was interpreted as consistent with airborne 
 
296. Wehrle et al., supra note 180, at 670. 
297. PRESTON, supra note 149, at 41. 
298. Wehrle et al., supra note 180, at 672. 
299. Id. at 674. 
300. Id.; FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 189 (indicate contact with one nurse, and only 
for brief periods). 
301. Wehrle et al., supra note 180, at 669. 
302. FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1115 (explaining that in the few suspected cases 
of airborne infection, the infected person’s clothing and bedlinens were heavily 
contaminated with viral secretions that may have served as a secondary source of 
infection); see also id. at 669, 677 (alleging that “seventeen cases were infected 
by virus particles disseminated by air over a considerable distance within a single 
hospital building,” showing that Wehrle did not consider the patient’s bronchitis 
and cough, noting that “patients with more serious smallpox infections transmit 
infection more effectively than those with a mild or modified illness,” especially 
when “accentuated by coughing,” and discounting the possibility of person-to-
person transmission via the nurses and object-to-person transmission via linens). 
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transmission because the smoke spread along the same pattern as the 
cases.303 Wehrle may have misinterpreted the results, however. The smoke 
plume, used as a surrogate for viral spread, dissipated as it rose, thereby 
reducing the concentration of smallpox particles as it spread.304 This would 
have rendered the patients on the third floor less likely to contract the 
disease than those closest to the index patient on the first floor, because 
the third-floor patients would have had less viral exposure. In actuality, 
more cases occurred on the third floor than the second, and more on the 
second that the first,305 which is scientifically contra-factual. 
The smoke test—which was performed in April—also relies on the 
assumption that the index patient’s window was open.306 In fact, it had 
been, but just a little.307 Whenever the patient could sneak a cigarette, he 
opened the window a crack; when the nurses entered the room, they 
ordered him to keep the window closed.308 Whether this was sufficient to 
allow enough contaminated air to escape and infect patients on floors 
above is questionable. For the smoke to have entered the patients’ rooms 
on the second and third floors, however, their windows would have needed 
to be open as well. There is no evidence to support this; indeed, since the 











303. Wehrle et al., supra note 180, at 674 (Smoke tests use smoke as a surrogate for 
viral spread, unleashing the smoke, and monitoring where it meanders, based on 
the assumption that a virus spreads in the same manner and location. Using 
smoke as a surrogate for a virus is problematic. For one thing, particle deposition 
differs; for example, smoke and its particles rise, while particles such as viruses or 
asbestos tend to fall to the ground in wet conditions). 
304. MICHAEL J. HODGSON ET AL., ASHRAE POSITION DOCUMENT ON AIRBORNE INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
(2009) (offering that it “is useful for understanding the impact of increasing the 
volume of fresh or disinfected air on airborne infection. Increasing [the volume of 
fresh air] decreases exposure by diluting air containing infectious particles with 
infectious-particle free air.”). Hodgson’s analysis would indicate that patients on 
the third floor would be less likely than patients on the second to have contracted 
the disease. 
305. Wehrle et al., supra note 180, at 674. 
306. PRESTON, supra note 149, at 32. 
307. Wehrle et al., supra note 180, at 674.  
308. PRESTON, supra note 149, at 32.  
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Ground Floor 15 3 30% 
1st Floor 34 5 15% 
2nd Floor 25 5 20% 
Total 74 13  
Figure 1. Attack Rates of Smallpox Among Hospitalized Patients by Floor in Hospital309 
 
Wehrle interpreted the results of the smoke test described earlier as 
consistent with airborne transmission, because the pattern of smoke 
dissemination was the same as where the cases were found.310 However, 
the smoke was used as a surrogate for viral spread and hence, the 
concentration of smallpox particles should have diluted as the plume 
rose,311 rendering the patients on the third floor less likely to contract the 
disease because they would have had less exposure as the plume dissipated 
when in fact, as noted earlier, the contrary occurred. 
Experimental attempts to replicate Wehrle’s assertions that airborne 
transmission occurred in Meschede have been unsuccessful. In 1961, 
“attempts to recover smallpox virus by air sampling in the [smallpox] wards 
and in close proximity to the patient’s mouth were practically all 
unsuccessful.”312 Further, examination of the air samples 
indicates that virus collected from in front of the patient’s mouth was 
present in relatively large droplets or particles . . . [but e]ven when 
talking and coughing, patients with lesions in the mouth seem to eject 
very little virus in small droplets of the aerosol type.313 
.  .  . 
The frequent failure to find virus in the air samples collected in the 
impinger was rather surprising. Even air sampled with the impinger 
held near the mouths of patients who had obvious mouth lesions and 
who talked or coughed during the period of collection was usually 
 
309. The above chart accounts for only thirteen patients of the first generation’s 
seventeen. There may have been greater dissipation on the second floor, but the 
plume would have been less concentrated and, hence, less infectious. This data is 
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negative. In many of these patients, swabs from circum-oral skin and 
pillow yielded virus . . . . [O]ur results indicate that very little virus is 
discharged from the mouth of the patient in droplets or droplet 
nuclei of this order of size when he is breathing, talking, or 
coughing.314 
In virtually all the cases in which health authorities allegedly observed 
airborne transmission in hospitals, transmission could have occurred 
through non-human sources, like contaminated laundry and clothing,315 or 
via carriers such as doctors and nurses. Wehrle ruled out this possibility, 
asserting that there were no cases in other parts of the hospital “despite 
the sharing of food-preparing and laundry facilities and frequent movement 
of staff between the first and second floors of the isolation building and the 
main hospital building.”316 However, this observation does not eliminate 
the possibility that inanimate objects or indirect transmission were 
responsible for infection within the unit. 
While Fenner notes that infection “rarely[ ] seemed to be airborne over 
a considerable distance.”317 Fenner and Wehrle are adamant that the index 
case’s contact with the nursing staff was insignificant.318 However, it 
appears that in addition to the night nurse,319 who Wehrle rejected as a 
transmission vector because her contact with the index patient was brief—
though he did not quantify how brief—two nurses were assigned to him 
during the day,320 and their cumulative exposure may not have been so 
minimal. The patient was on antibiotics that were administered multiple 
times a day by the nurses. He was forbidden to use the bathroom and made 
to use a bedpan, which meant that nurses entered his room several times 
a day to empty it.321 Nurses also brought food carts and removed them from 
the patient’s room several times a day,322 all suggesting that the nurses’ 
cumulative exposure may not have been as minimal as heretofore assumed. 
Further, the index patient had a cough which might have accounted for 
infecting people at a short distance.323 Even Wehrle notes that 
 
314. Id. at 621. 
315. W.H. Bradley, Smallpox in England and Wales 1962, 56 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 335, 
336 (1963); Downie et al., supra note 312. 
316. Wehrle et al., supra note 180, at 673. 
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320. Id.; FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 192. 
321. Wehrle et al., supra note 180, at 670. 
322. See id. at 673. 
323. Id. at 677. 
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patients with more serious smallpox infections transmit infection 
more effectively than those with a mild or modified illness. This is 
attributed to the fact that such patients are likely to have a greater 
number of lesions on the mucous membranes, thus shedding larger 
quantities of virus into the saliva and subsequently into the air. At 
Meschede, virus dissemination was undoubtedly accentuated by 
coughing and the virus particles undoubtedly survived in the air for 
unusually long periods since the relative humidity in the hospital was 
very low.324 
Another overlooked possible mode of transmission is the doctor who 
examined the index case on admission, Dr. Deiter Enste, and who saw him 
on at least one occasion thereafter.325 Later when the patient’s conditioned 
worsened a number of new doctors examined him.326 When the patient 
manifested a rash, the doctors punctured a pustule on his skin, drained the 
pus onto a cotton swab, and put it in a test tube.327 A state official then took 
the test tube to the regional smallpox expert, Karl Heinz Richter, at the state 
health department in Düsseldorf.328 This procedure involved both 
personnel and equipment, both of which might have been infection 
conduits. 
After making the diagnosis, Richter spoke to Wehrle, and Wehrle’s first 
hand reports only begin at this time.329 Richter ordered that the patient be 
transferred to a special isolation-unit hospital thirty miles away.330 To move 
the patient, “a squad of attendants dressed in plastic biohazard suits and 
with masks over their faces ran inside the building and wrapped [the 
patient] in a plastic biocontainment bag that had breathing holes in it.”331 
But no one can be sure the biohazard suits were secure, and if not, a pinhole 
or a lapse in safety protocol when removing protective biohazard garb can 
create an opportunity for infection and transmission. 
Even with the claimed and feared airborne transmission, a case-fatality 
rate of twenty-five percent, and a reproductive rate of seventeen—for the 
first generation, which went down to two for the second—a total of twenty 
cases and four deaths occurred in Meschede;332 a far cry from any of the 
pandemic projections related to DW. 
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F. Yugoslavia in 1972: Instant Access to Eighteen Million Doses of Vaccine 
The most recent smallpox epidemic in an industrialized country 
occurred in Yugoslavia in 1972. Again, the events mimicked the worst 
nightmare of DW’s epidemic planners. The outbreak’s unusual and 
explosive initial presentation resulted in part from the hemorrhagic 
smallpox suffered by an early case, and the sizeable number of susceptible 
individuals in the population. The index case infected almost a dozen people 
before the disease was diagnosed, and he exposed hundreds of others.333 
Delayed diagnosis was prevalent, hospital transmission was rampant, 
unsuccessful revaccinations were common, and communication problems 
in tracing contacts were considerable.334 The Yugoslav epidemic also had an 
extraordinarily high replication rate of thirty-eight cases spread by one 
person during the first of the three generations of transmission,335 leading 
to an artificial average replication of 12.8.336 In actuality one person in the 
second generation infected thirty-eight others, while others infected 
none,337 hence the 12.8 number is a rank artificial average. Conventional 
mathematical modeling predicted that twenty-one thousand people would 
be infected and that about seven thousand would die. The facts, however, 
indicate otherwise. When the epidemic ended, only 175 people had been 
affected and only thirty-five had died.338 
The epidemic began in early February. The index case, a Muslim cleric, 
Ibrahim Hoti, who was vaccinated two months earlier, contracted smallpox 
en route from Mecca to his home in Kosovo, Yugoslavia.339 The cleric was 
leading a group of twenty-four people on a pilgrimage for the Hajj,340 which 
was attended by approximately 688,000 people that year,341 about 2700 
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340. See FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1091. 
341. DAVID E. LONG, THE HAJJ TODAY: A SURVEY OF THE CONTEMPORARY PILGRIMAGE TO 
MAKKAH 114 (1979). 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
Weapons of Mass Hysteria, Faulty Biothreat Predictions, and Their Impact on 
National (In)Security: A Case-Study of Smallpox 
395 
from Kosovo alone.342 In addition to visiting Mecca, the group traveled by 
bus to Baghdad, which was suffering its own smallpox epidemic, and spent 
three nights in a hotel there, although Hoti denied having contact with 
smallpox patients. Hoti also visited a market and dervish sanctuaries in 
nearby Basra,343 where the virus was also registered. While most reports 
attribute Hoti’s infection to his sojourn in Iraq, it is equally possible that he 
contracted the disease in Mecca, perhaps from a co-pilgrim. 
On February 6, 1972, Hoti and his party returned to his native village of 
Danjani in Kosovo.344 A few days later he manifested signs of illness, but 
there was limited evidence of rash, and relatives, friends, and 
acquaintances visited him.345 Eleven visitors contracted smallpox between 
March 1 and 7. None of his twenty-one immediate family members became 
ill, including his three unvaccinated children.346 No one suspected smallpox 
until March 14, by which time sixteen more people had contracted the 
disease. They, in turn, infected others. Social conditions undoubtedly 
contributed to the epidemic’s development.347 Specifically, “[f]amilies in 
which variola was present were usually very poor and lived in hard 
residential conditions. There was the custom that everyone ate and drank 
from the same dish and slept together in a bed littered at the floor without 
boarding.”348 
On March 24, Yugoslave health officials notified the WHO, but between 
March 15 and 30, an additional one hundred cases were diagnosed, 
constituting the disease’s second generation.349 Between April 1 and 11, 
fourteen more cases were recorded in Kosovo, constituting the third 
generation.350 Between mid-March and mid-April, 124 people were 
affected and twenty-six died.351 One of the cases Hoti infected was a thirty-
year-old teacher named Ljatif Muzza, who contracted an especially virulent 
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form of hemorrhagic smallpox.352 Muzza was seen in no fewer than four 
medical institutions, exposing dozens of medical-care personnel with whom 
he came in close and prolonged contact, although no one suspected he had 
smallpox. On March 8, Muzza was transferred from Caceck Hospital via 
ambulance in the company of an unidentified pregnant woman who did not 
become infected.353 Retrospective evaluation confirmed the diagnosis, 
indicating that he had infected a total of thirty-eight patients, eight of 
whom died.354 Muzza died two days after admission, on March 10.355 
Because Muzza had thousands of difficult-to-trace contacts, the 
government undertook a mass vaccination campaign, which later was 
extended to the entire country. Within three weeks, eighteen million of the 
country’s population of twenty-one million were vaccinated.356 While 
medical personnel should have been vaccinated previously, this policy had 
not been implemented,357 leaving unprotected medical personnel and first 
responders who had refused vaccination out of fear of the dangers of 
vaccination.358 
It is not difficult to understand how a communist country could use 
martial law to enforce quarantine. The government imposed isolation 
directives, roadblocks, and other drastic measures, including detaining 
suspected carriers under armed guard, forcing cancellations of events at 
which large numbers of people might collect, and compelling mass 
vaccination.359 The Yugoslav incident, however, occurred in a population in 
which language differences impaired communications between the 
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353. Litvinjenko et al., supra note 338, at 2. 
354. FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1092. 
355. Id. 
356. Id. at 1094. 
357. Lane, supra note 346, at 13. 
358. Id. (“The press and medical authorities readily acknowledged that this policy has 
not been vigorously implemented. Some medical personnel were apparently 
afraid of vaccination, having received most of their ideas about vaccination from 
the writings of Herrlich. Magazine and newspaper articles commented on the 
practice of selling certificates of exemptions from vaccination, and named names 
of physicians who refused vaccination themselves . . . . The CDC teams performed 
several surveys of take rates in villages in and around the infected communes of 
Kosovo. These surveys indicated that from 22 to 30 percent of the population had 
primary reactions and were thus either previously immunized, or in some 
instances were aged people with remote primary vaccinations.” This is not as 
Neanderthal a reaction as might seem. Following the 2001-2 bioterrorist scare, 
when vaccine was finally released, CDC’s own physicians refused to be vaccinated, 
and medical personnel and first responders across the nation followed suit.). 
359. Guillemin, supra note 333, at 275. 
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affected population and medical and governmental personnel, a factor that 
could have—but did not—negatively impacted results. 
Yugoslavia procured more than eighteen million doses of vaccine in less 
than two weeks; the country itself had one million doses on hand. WHO 
supplied only 500,000 doses as demand was especially acute that year and 
it had to supply other countries as well.360 A total of an additional 13.5 
million doses came from other nations, (see Appendix figure 2) for a grand 
total of fifteen million doses. 361 From where did Marshal Tito, a Yugoslavian 
leader, obtain these and the missing three million doses? It is likely that at 
least some of the missing doses were created by diluting existing 
vaccines.362 The authors of the DW exercise did not include the possibility 
of either dilution or importation of stocks from other countries in their war 
game, nor was it raised in any of the post-exercise literature produced. 
By the time health officials officially declared the epidemic over on May 
9, 1972, 175 cases and thirty-five deaths had been reported.363 Eight 
percent of those who died had previously been vaccinated;364 ten percent 
of the cases were the hemorrhagic type, but the overall case-fatality rate 
did not exceed twenty percent.365 The statistics were attributed to three 
factors: first, the frequent and close contact between families;366 second, 
the multiple hospitalizations fostering in-hospital contact;367 and third, the 
low rate of vaccination among hospital and medical workers.368 
G. 1973 and 1978: Laboratory Outbreaks 
Some questions have been raised regarding whether risks associated 
with vaccination outweigh the risk of infection. A secondary risk associated 
 
360. FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 567 (noting that Iran, Iraq, and Syria were also 
suffering from outbreaks at that time, and they required seventeen million doses). 
361. Lane, supra note 346, at 30 (showing that Yugoslavia received three million doses 
from the former Soviet Union, 2.325 million from Switzerland, 3.5 million from 
China, plus additional doses from Canada, the United States, and others; it is 
feasible that those same countries continue to keep similar stockpiles to this day, 
a possibility that DW does not consider). 
362. Sharon E. Frey et al., Clinical Responses to Undiluted and Diluted Smallpox Vaccine, 
346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1265, 1265 (2002) (explaining the vaccine is still useful with 
1:5 and 1:10 dilutions). 
363. FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1094. 
364. Litvinjenko et al., supra note 338, at 5.  
365. Id. 
366. Guillemin, supra note 333, at 278 (explaining that the virus spreads among 
families because of “the frequent, intimate contact of large extended families in a 
rural setting, a demographic feature not typical in the United States, where many 
people live alone, but common among immigrants, minorities, and the poor.”). 
367. Id. at 279. 
368. Lane, supra note 346, at 13. 
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with vaccination involves dangers inherent in experimentation,369 including 
failure to properly dispose of research specimens, potentially endangering 
laboratory workers. It must be recognized that such danger cannot be 
totally eliminated.370 In 1973 and 1978, these risks came to fruition in the 
United Kingdom, causing six cases and three deaths.371 
The 1978 laboratory accident further illustrates smallpox’s poor 
capacity for transmission. Following the index case’s infection, health 
authorities identified approximately three hundred people who might have 
had contact with the patient during her illness, including her family 
members and relatives, patients of the hospital, and her colleagues at the 
medical school.372 None became ill.373 
VI. Analysis 
A. Modeling Revisited 
In a word, the value of mathematical modeling is limited. As one expert 
said: 
There are efforts to predict the best anti-epidemic measures on the 
base of mathematic modeling . . . . The quality and predictive value 
[of mathematical modeling is] limited and depend[s] very much on 
the inclusion of a sufficient number of necessary and correct 
parameters. A slight change in a parameter can lead to exaggerated 
effects that do not follow the common sense experience. A lot of 
decisive factors can only be roughly estimated, like transmission rate, 
population immunity or the effectiveness of post-exposure 
vaccination.374 
Factors that vary from epidemic to epidemic affect the pattern, speed, 
and duration of an outbreak. Using past epidemics to predict future 
epidemics’ outcomes is thus fraught with problems and danger. 
Reproductive rates estimated from historical data and outbreaks in 
developing countries are inapt measure in today’s modern society.375 
Different release scenarios “yield different results in part because the 
 
369. See, e.g., FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1095. 
370. See Jen Christensen, CDC: Smallpox found in NIH storage room is alive, CNN (July 
11, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/11/health/smallpox-found-nih-alive/ 
(explaining how employees found two viable anthrax samples when they were 
preparing to move a lab to a different location). 
371. FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1097. 
372. Id. 
373. Id. 
374. Ammon et al., supra note 143, at 413. 
375. Milton, supra note 90, at 1. 
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parameters and modified natural history of the outbreak itself will vary with 
the scenarios,”376 and therefore would prove futile in projecting new 
estimates. Moreover, it is difficult and expensive to model how quickly 
smallpox would spread in a developed nation. 
Models may have a limited role in deciding appropriate response 
actions, but mindless attention to modeled data is counterproductive. Even 
D.A. Henderson cautions against accepting models without scrutiny 
because they could ultimately create policies that “take a perfectly 
manageable epidemic and turn it into a national disaster.”377 
B. Replication Rate 
Mainstream scientists today agree that smallpox’s replication rate is 
nowhere near the ten to twenty that DW assumes.378 Even the CDC strategy 
is only “based on the assumption that each infected person will infect only 
two or three others.”379 In fact, one patient rarely infects more than a few 
others, and very rarely without direct or face-to-face contact. Only models 
or scenarios that rely on outliers, like the Meschede and Yugoslavia 
outbreaks, disagree.380 However, even in those extraordinary cases high 
replication rates only existed for one generation.381 
Moreover, in every real-life epidemic in the last century the 
reproduction rate decreased sharply after the second generation. 
Furthermore, in no epidemic was the replication rate linear; after a peak 
replication rate was reached—generally during the first generation—the 
replication rate sharply declined. A model’s use of the same replication rate 
throughout all generations of the outbreak is, therefore, biologically invalid. 
The results that the DW fable predicts are a therefore a function of 
arbitrary mathematics, not biology or actual historical events viewed in 
their entirety.382 DW relies on “constantly upward revisions [that] are driven 
by a cruel epidemiologic statistic—the highest reproductive rate of disease, 
or average number of new infections each case creates,” selected from the 
generation with the highest number.383 It disregards variations among 
 
376. Bhatnagar et al., supra note 176, at 10. 
377. STANLEY M. LEMON ET AL., ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN MITIGATING PANDEMIC 
DISEASE 16 (2007). 
378. See, e.g. Weinstein et al., supra note 186; Tovey, supra note 232. 
379. Bicknell, supra note 65. 
380. Guillemin, supra note 333, at 278 (“The extraordinarily high transmission rate of 
1:12 for the Yugoslavian smallpox outbreak is an unreliable basis for an imagined 
United States attack scenario, although the extrapolation is commonly made.”). 
381. Bhatnagar et al., supra note 176 (noting that the Nigerian epidemic’s high 
replication rate, 6.9, was due entirely to close household contacts). 
382. See generally Dark Winter, supra note 86. 
383. Michaud & Kates, supra note 35. 
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different epidemics, variations within an epidemic, and other key factors. 
By selecting the highest reproductive rates available without regard to 
biological plausibility or historical accuracy, it is easy to game the system, 
which is exactly what DW did. 
C. Delay in Diagnosis 
One dreaded concern fueling the DW statistics is an anticipated delay 
in diagnosis resulting from physicians’ unfamiliarity with the disease, 
thereby allowing contagious cases to go unnoticed,384 and poised to launch 
an infection-avalanche—an alarmist claim suggesting that second or third-
generation cases would move about unfettered, thereby exposing others. 
Delayed diagnosis, however, would not be a new phenomenon and is 
not predictive of a runaway epidemic. In historical examples, physicians 
frequently failed to diagnose smallpox for two weeks or more, and in at 
least three instances, more than four weeks from presentation of the index 
case elapse prior to diagnosis.385 In fact, although it was not unusual to 
detect the index case until two or three generations of cases occurred, the 
epidemics were nevertheless rapidly and effectively contained—even when 
doctors were unfamiliar with the disease.386 
In Yugoslavia, even though the index case occurred in “one of the 
country’s least[-]developed areas,” involved an undiagnosed man who 
moved from hospital to hospital, and took a month to be diagnosed, the 
government was still able to effectively contain the outbreak.387 The same 
situation occurred in New York. And once diagnosis was made, laboratory 
confirmation was often delayed taking between weeks, as in Germany, and 
a month, as in NYC, the epidemic was rapidly contained. Even once clinical 
diagnosis was made, laboratory delays stalled action. Nevertheless, the 
epidemics were rapidly contained. Some of these delays in reporting to 
government officials, which occurred because of delayed laboratory 
confirmation—sometimes taking upwards of a month, would not occur 
today, because the turn-around time in modern lab analysis is often less 
than twenty-four or forty-eight hours.388 
 
384. Dark Winter, supra note 86. 
385. Wehrle et al., supra note 180, at 676. 
386. D. A. Henderson, Importations of Smallpox into Europe 1961-1972, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., WHO/SE/74/62, 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/67627/1/WHO_SE_74.62.pdf; see 
Litvinjenko et al., supra note 338, at 7. (The physicians had no personal experience 
in its diagnosis, epidemiology, or control. Thus, there was a delay before the 
correct diagnosis was made even though the clinic picture of the first generation 
of cases was typical.). 
387. FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1077. 
388. See, e.g., Leonard F. Peruski, Jr. & Anne Harwood Peruski, Rapid diagnostic assays 
in the genomic biology era: detection and identification of infectious disease and 
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In summary, because it takes weeks to infect a substantial number of 
people, even delays in diagnosis should not prevent effective 
containment.389 And delays in diagnosis would be somewhat compensated 
by the rapidity of today’s laboratory assessments, which was unavailable in 
the past. 
D. Infectivity and Spread 
The recent interest in smallpox bioterrorism has provoked discussion 
about the parameters that govern the virus’s transmissibility. Using 
historical data from a 1967 epidemic in a previously unvaccinated group in 
Nigeria, one set of prominent researchers found that these data supported 
“the widely held belief that smallpox spreads slowly, mainly among close 
contacts, and that infectivity before the onset of rash was negligible.”390 
“Extensive studies in both endemic and non-endemic countries” that show 
that close, prolonged, and personal contact are necessary predicates to 
smallpox transmission.391 These studies “clearly indicated the necessity for 
close, and often prolonged, personal contact before transmission 
occurs.”392 The few cases of transmission without direct contact are the rare 
exception, rather than the rule.393 
As noted earlier, whether an individual contracts smallpox depends on 
whether she has had enough exposure to reach the threshold dose,394 
which helps explain why brief contact usually fails to induce illness.395 
Indeed, exposure to low doses of smallpox, the practice of variolation 
widely practiced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,396 was once 
the preferred means of preventing the disease.397 
 
biological weapon agents, 35 BIOTECHNIQUES 840 (2003) (providing that infectious 
diseases can now be rapidly diagnosed). 
389. Id. at 677. 
390. Eichner & Dietz, supra note 73 (internal quotations omitted). 
391. Henderson, supra note 386, at 2. 
392. Id. at 2. 
393. Id. 
394. Heiner et al., supra note 119, at 1, 5. 
395. Id. at 5 (“Contacts whose duration of exposure was seven days or more showed 
significantly higher attack rates than persons exposed for less than seven days.”). 
396. C. BEATTY, SMALLPOX IN THE AMERICAS 1492-1815: CONTAGION AND CONTROVERSY (2002). 
397. See David A. Freedman, On types of scientific inquiry: The role of qualitative 
reasoning, STATISTICS AT UC BERKLEY, at 2, 
http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~census/anomaly.pdf (“As a preventive measure, 
patients could be deliberately infected (through scratches on the skin) with 
minute quantities of material taken from smallpox pustules, the idea being to 
induce a mild case of the disease that would confer immunity later.”) (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2017). 
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Even in the Yugoslavia incident, secondary cases originated from a 
single source because the patient had long and intimate contact with 
susceptible people.398 As Fenner states: “virtually all cases in the last 
century arose in the context of hospital/medical treatment or intimate 
contact with cases in affected households.”399 
It is critical to keep in mind that contrary to popular belief, smallpox is 
far less infectious than measles and various strains of flu.400 Most smallpox 
experts believe that “smallpox is a barely contagious and very slow-
spreading infection.”401 A former director of the smallpox-eradication unit 
at the CDC, Michael Lane, argues that “the way it spread in Dark Winter was 
‘silly’” and that “[t]here’s no way that’s going to happen.”402 
E. Susceptibility  
Another concern is population susceptibility, leading to the fear that 
Americans would be easy prey. In the outbreaks studied, poor population 
immunity did not result in run-away epidemics.403 Moreover, 
counterbalancing factors of modern industrialized life-styles would likely 
compensate, such as better medical care, intervention and nutrition.404 The 
existence of 
[m]icro-organisms are necessary but not sufficient in the causation of 
infectious disease and other causal factors are required for infection 
to occur . . . . Indeed, the decline in infectious diseases in high-
income countries is more readily attributed to increased host 
 
398. See Litvinjenko et al., supra note 338, at 5. 
399. FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1076. 
400. Amy Parker Fiebelkorn & James L. Goodson, Infectious Diseases Related to Travel, 
July 10, 2015, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/yellowbook/2016/infectious-
diseases-related-to-travel/measles-rubeola; Robert Roos, Study puts global 2009 
pandemic H1N1 infection rate at 24%, CTR. INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESEARCH & POL’Y, 
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2013/01/study-puts-global-
2009-pandemic-h1n1-infection-rate-24 (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
401. Enserink, supra note 85, at 1592. 
402. Id.; see also FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 85 (Measles bears a case-fatality rate 
of 4.5%, supporting the connection that case-fatality rate and infectiousness are 
inversely proportional: “Transmission of measles is more efficient and rapid than 
was the spread of smallpox. Black (1966) has shown that in populations of about 
the same size, measles spread more rapidly and outbreaks terminated sooner in 
areas of greater population density.”). 
403. See, e.g., Litvinjenko et al., supra note 338, at 7 (In Yugoslavia, “[o]f late, the 
percentage of town children who have been vaccinated is decreasing . . . . Among 
the more elderly citizens, the immunity acquired through previous vaccinations 
had greatly decreased or vanished so that there was a large number of persons 
susceptible to the disease.”); see also Wehrle et al., supra note 180 (questioning 
vaccine effectiveness in Germany). 
404. Šuvakoviü et al., supra note 343, at 301-02. 
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resistance from better nutrition than to a reduction in the virulence 
of the relevant micro-organisms.405 
And while “[m]ost people in the United States today lack immunity, 
which could make matters much worse than in the past. On the other hand, 
they don’t live in crowded and squalid conditions, like many of the disease’s 
. . . victims, which could reduce transmission rates.”406 
F. Case-Fatality Rates 
Major texts assert that smallpox has a worldwide case-fatality of 
twenty percent,407 although this figure is an average, and based on historical 
data without specification of which years and which locales are being 
considered. While in the past centuries in unindustrialized countries 
without modern medicine smallpox was known to produce a case-fatality 
rate of thirty percent, using that figure for pandemic planning today is 
plainly inappropriate. In point of fact, in post-WWII non-endemic countries 
the case-fatality drops to sixteen percent or less.408 
The United States’ experience with smallpox is comparatively benign, 
even before the age of modern medicine. In the Boston epidemic of 1721, 
844 of 5980 infected people died, producing a case-fatality rate of fourteen 
percent.409 According to the CDC, in 1900 there were more than 21,000 
cases, with a case-fatality rate of four percent.410 Between 1900 and 1904, 
smallpox caused an average of 48,164 cases and 1528 deaths,411 producing 
a case-fatality rate of three percent. The high case-fatality rate DW assumes 
is not in line with historical epidemics. 
G. Spread by Air Travel 
One of the most feared means of international dissemination is 
international air transport, a mode of transportation that has increased in 
 
405. Roberts, supra note 155, at 660. 
406. Enserink, supra note 85, 1593. 
407. See generally T. R. HARRISON ET AL., HARRISON’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE (Jean 
D. Wilson ed., 12th ed. 1990) (publishing information regarding smallpox 
without having direct experience with smallpox in 1991 and deriving data from 
texts published prior to 1950). 
408. See, e.g., FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1077. 
409. HARV. UNIV., The Boston Smallpox Epidemic, 1721, 
http://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/contagion/smallpox.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
410. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Achievements in Public Health, 1900-1999 
Impact of Vaccines Universally Recommended for Children—United States, 1990-
1998, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 243 (1999) (providing that 21,064 
people contracted smallpox and 894 died, producing a case-fatality rate of 0.04). 
411. Id. 
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use dramatically over the last decades.412 Some public-health practitioners 
assume that international air travel would increase the likelihood of a 
pandemic because of the high number of potential contacts in an airport 
setting or on an airplane. They claim those who are exposed might continue 
to spread the disease upon arrival at their respective destinations and to 
casual contacts along the way. In fact, the data points otherwise. Though 
air travel has considerably increased in recent years, outbreaks have been 
far less frequent than in the past.413 
Contrary to DW’s assumptions, air travel is not a new development: 
[i]n the early nineteen fifties airports were concerned with only 
hundreds of thousands of passengers each year; whereas in 1961 
more than 100 million passengers used the international routes, and 
at London Airport there were 6 million passenger movements.414 
The longer plane trips of the 1960s and 1970s would have been more 
conducive to effective transmission than today’s shorter, more frequent 
trips. As more people traveled between North America and places where 
smallpox was still endemic, some believed that “there was a constant and 
increasing risk of importing smallpox into North America . . . [but o]nly 1 
importation of smallpox into North America was reported—a single case of 
variola minor imported from Brazil into Canada via the USA.”415 
Even though “[t]wenty-seven of the 29 importations [into Europe] from 
overseas for which data are available were associated with air travel,” no 
transmission occurred on an airplane.416 Between 1950 and 1973, there 
were at least fifty smallpox outbreaks in Europe that originated in ten 
different countries from the Indian subcontinent, Africa, and the Middle 
East.417 These outbreaks resulted in “1113 cases and 107 deaths . . . . 
Twenty-four of the index patients from these outbreaks travelled by air, two 
by sea, and 1 by land. About one-half of these cases [generated in the 
epidemic] occurred by nosocomial transmission among hospital personnel 
and their contacts, hospital patients, and visitors.”418 In none of them did 
transmission occur en route.419 
 
412. Wehrle et al., supra note 180, at 676. 
413. Id. at 669. 
414. GREAT BRITAIN MINISTRY OF HEALTH, SMALLPOX 1961-62, at 4 (1963). 
415. FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1081. 
416. Id. at 1074. 
417. Abbas M. Behbehani, The Smallpox Story: Life and Death of an Old Disease, 47 
MICROBIOLOGICAL REVS. 455, 487 (1983). 
418. Id. 
419. FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1081 (“As international air traffic increased in the 
1960s and 1970s, and many more people travelled from Canada and the USA to 
Africa, South American and Asia, in which smallpox was still endemic, there was a 
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In 1962, the United Kingdom, receiving increasing numbers of airline 
passengers, reported five smallpox outbreaks triggered by five travelers 
arriving from Karachi, Pakistan.420 At the time, “special charter flight 
arrangements were in vogue to move these people quickly, cheaply and in 
maximum numbers by air,”421 yet investigators found that “[t]here is no 
evidence that they infected any of their fellow travellers [sic].”422 In addition 
to exposing fellow passengers on the flight, other opportunities for 
exposure included taxi or train rides from the airport. There is no evidence 
that such transmission occurred.423 
In most countries during the post-WWII years, passengers from 
endemic areas were not allowed to disembark without a certificate proving 
they had received a smallpox vaccination.424 No epidemic or pandemic 
resulted, even though “[i]n 1960 just over 2 million passengers arrived at 
London Airport who were [without any documentation proving that they 
had been vaccinated].”425 The Ministry of Health stated that, in retrospect, 
one might remark upon the good fortune that these did not 
apparently infect anyone during flight; for the aircraft, carrying 
maximum pay-loads, were full and a first generation might well have 
been infected before arrival, if recent vaccination had been 
unsuccessful, and have subsequently dispersed widely over the 
country before their own, possibly vaccine-modified, smallpox came 
to light.426 
Even super-spreaders like the Yugoslavian patient  
did not spread the illness to any contacts on either his bus ride . . . or 
his ambulance ride. This keeps unblemished the European experience 
that smallpox has not been transmitted on a common carrier such as 
a bus, plane, or train. The contingency plans for a United States 
importation should consider such transmission highly unlikely.427 
 
constant and increasing risk of importing smallpox into North America . . . . 
[However, o]nly 1 important of smallpox into North America was reported—a 
single case of variola minor important from Brazil into Canada via the USA.”). 
420. Bradley, supra note 315, at 335. 
421. GREAT BRITAIN MINISTRY OF HEALTH, supra note 414, at 4. 
422. Id. at 1. 
423. Id. at 10. 
424. Id. at 4. 
425. Id. 
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H. Airborne or Weaponized Transmission 
DW-type projections depend on aerosol transmission via weaponized 
smallpox, obviating the need for long duration and close contact. Based on 
this possibility, one researcher promised that 
[i]nfected terrorists could expose people in several cities (and on 
public transportation between cities) before becoming visibly ill. 
Identifying such cases of exposure within the four-day period is 
logistically impossible. Furthermore, aerosolized dispersion of the 
virus could make the situation much worse . . . . A single case of 
smallpox in the Yugoslav outbreak required the administration of 18 
million doses of vaccine to arrest the spread of disease in a 
population with substantial immunity.428 
To date, fifteen years after DW, attempts to weaponize smallpox 
appear to have failed. Further, while it cannot be absolutely refuted that 
aerosol transmission may have a role in spread, that role, if it does exist, is 
minor.429 And the Meschede outbreak is the only one in “which a large 
group of cases at a considerable distance from the index patient appears to 
have been infected as a result of transmission of the virus by air”430 or by 
large particle or droplet infection.431 Even those who contend that airborne 
transmission is possible concede that transmission only occurs during active 
infection, i.e., when a rash is visible.432 
In summary, an effective bioterrorist-instigated airborne transmission 
would require the confluence of two rare events: an initial release via 
airborne transmission and the consequent spread by patients without a 
visible rash. The statistical odds of two such unlikely events acting 
contemporaneously are highly remote. 
 
428. Bicknell, supra note 65, at 1323. 
429. Milton, supra note 90 (“Mack . . . emphasized that 85% of cases had clear-cut 
exposures to known cases. However, the remaining 15% had no obvious exposure 
suggesting that a small number of more distant or casual contacts transmitted 
infection as would be expected if smallpox were transmitted by dilute virus 
aerosols . . . . Some well-known hospital-associated outbreaks make it clear that 
airborne transmission at a distance of more than a few feet did occur occasionally. 
But, these examples were rare” (citations omitted).). 
430. Wehrle et al., supra note 180, at 677. 
431. Milton, supra note 90 (“[L]eading authorities disagree regarding the relative 
importance of fine and large particle routes of transmission; some state that 
smallpox was transmitted primarily via airborne droplet nuclei, while others 
emphasize ‘face-to-face’ contact and state that, airborne transmission was rare” 
(citations omitted).). 
432. NEW YORK DEP’T HEATH, supra note 190. 
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I.  Hype, Hyperbole, Hysteria, and the Press 
Notwithstanding historical data and experimental evidence 
demonstrating smallpox’s poor transmission potential, the hype continues. 
As Fenner writes, “[d]espite the prompt measures usually taken by the 
public health authorities, the deep-rooted if sometimes unfounded fears of 
the population were difficult to quell,” causing several countries to suffer 
considerably.433 
Hyperbolic media reports can worsen the public’s fear; the 
ramifications of inaccurate reporting and baseless opinions should be 
carefully considered in any public discussion—including wargames—
especially when enacted for lay politicians and media types. The real 
problems of an epidemic, however, may not be related to the disease itself, 
but to its economic after-effects. Perhaps if doctors and scientists were 
included in the “DW experience,” they might have come up with more 
innovative response measures. 
Dr. Derrick Tovey, who managed the Bradford incident, states that the 
most difficult part of his job was handling the press, because “[t]he national 
press was often irresponsible, printing such headlines as ‘City in Fear!’ ‘Keep 
Out Pakistanis’, [sic] but the local press, particularly the Telegraph & Argus, 
was helpful and reported accurately the local position which was of ‘refusal 
to panic’. [sic]”434 In the NYC episode, the press, following Weinstein’s lead, 
was exemplary: restrained, yet informative. At times the press can be the 
best antidote for addressing concerns and allaying hysteria; it can be used 
as an effective tool in motivating desired population behavior and 
conveying real-time information, or if used counter-productively, the worst 
adjuvant, creating or exacerbating infectivity and counter-productive 
behavior. 
Thus, instead of the prudent calm that Tovey and Weinstein dispensed, 
today’s pundits, both scientific and political, seem to relish in hysteria-
mongering. Cloaked in the do-goodism of motivating the government to be 
prepared, the press drives the hysteria by advising the government to 
obtain ill-advised vaccines for mass vaccination.435 Interestingly, Tara 
 
433. FENNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 1077-78 (“[I]n the first few days after the 
recognition of the large outbreak in Yugoslavia, the country was in turmoil: people 
were afraid to visit public places until they and their families had been protected 
by vaccination; trucks carrying market-products from affected areas were turned 
back; tourist bookings were cancelled; and some countries closed their borders 
and advised their nationals not to visit Yugoslavia.”). 
434. Tovey, supra note 232, at 246 (emphasis added); Eric Butterworth, The 1962 
Smallpox Outbreak and the British Press, 7 RACE & CLASS 347, 351, 355 (2004) 
(noting that the kernel seeding the hysteria was not the disease itself, but 
legislation reform restricting immigration or visits of foreigners, sparked by the 
index case being Pakistani). 
435. See, e.g., PRESTON supra note 149, at 58 (“It has taken the world twenty years to 
reach roughly fifty million cases of AIDS. Variola could reach that point in ten or 
twenty weeks. The outbreak grows not in a straight line but in an exponential rise, 
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O’Toole, the co-creator of DW, did accept some responsibility for hysteria-
mongering,436 but she also asserts that the media, too, is responsible. At the 
end of the DW exercise, she asserted that “there were still fewer dead than 
at Pearl Harbor.”437 
J. Vaccine Availability 
O’Toole, in explaining DW, stated that one reason the DW scenario 
“was so bleak . . . is that the scenario provided only 15.4 million doses of 
vaccine,” which she inaccurately believed was the U.S. stockpile at the 
time.438 In fact, DW tells participants there were only twelve million doses 
available.439 But the actual available doses should have been more than 
enough to quell the outbreak if used responsibly, which the audience could 
not have known. 
DW also assumed that, in 2002, the United States government could 
not obtain more doses of the vaccine,440 even though—over forty years 
ago—Yugoslavia procured more than eighteen million doses in less than 
two weeks.441 In reality, in 2002, the DOD had between seventy-five and 
ninety million doses that were hiding in DOD’s closets—their existence was 
only revealed after the DW exercise and the allocation of government 
funding.442 O’Toole also failed to consider that dilution is effective,443 and 
would have rendered the entire exercise moot,444 because the United States 
had the capacity to produce enough diluted vaccine for every American at 
the time.445 But the actual available doses should have been more than 
 
expanding at a faster and faster rate. It begins as a flicker of something in the 
straw in a barn full of hay, easy to put out with a glass of water if it’s noticed right 
then. But it quickly gives way to branching chains of explosive transmissions of a 
lethal virus in a virgin population of non-immune hosts. It is a biological chain 
reaction.”); see also MULLER supra note 61, at 54 (use of the charged language 
characterizing smallpox as a “chain reaction”).  
436. Enserink, supra note 85, at 1593 (“‘We have to take some of the responsibility’ for 
giving smallpox an extremely scary reputation, concedes O’Toole.”). 
437. Id. (citation omitted).  
438. Id. 
439. Dark Winter, supra note 86. 
440. Id. 
441. See Flight, supra note 352. 
442. Robert Roos, FDA Licenses Repackaged Smallpox Vaccine from Federal Stockpile, 
CTR. INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESEARCH & POL’Y (Nov. 5, 2002), 
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2002/11/fda-licenses-
repackaged-smallpox-vaccine-federal-stockpile. 
443. Douglas & Edgar, supra note 248, at 614. 
444. Id. 
445. Interview by Victoria Harden with Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, Director, Nat’l Inst. Allergy 
& Infectious Diseases (Aug. 9, 2002), 
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enough to quell the outbreak if used responsibly through ring vaccination 
(see infra, next page), which the lay audience could not have known. 
Moreover, the dilution possibility was only tested after the new vaccines 
were ordered and found effective. 
K. Vaccine Hysteria 
To investigate the realism of tying hysteria to lack of vaccine, I pose the 
following four questions: 
a. Would inadequate vaccine engender hysteria as Dark Winter predicts? 
The answer depends on how the shortage is handled. When Health 
Commissioner Weinstein faced the problem in NYC in 1947, he was able to 
avoid the hysteria. Footage from a Germany epidemic demonstrates the 
same thing: no hysteria.446 Today’s politicians and press could achieve the 
same result through hysteria-prevention tactics. In fact, taking lessons in 
hysteria prevention from the DW exercise might have been a better 
outcome than procuring 300 million doses of vaccine. 
b. Was an approach other than mass vaccination available?  
Mass vaccination is not the only option; there is another approach, ring 
vaccination, that was used to eradicate endemic smallpox in the 1970s.447 
Ring vaccination targets only individuals in an area with suspected 
exposure, forming a ring around the outbreak, and effectively choking it 
off.448 Since the smallpox vaccine poses a real danger,449 ring vaccination 




446. F. G. Comb, Small Pox in Germany 1962, BRITISH PATHÉ (Nov. 11, 1962), 
http://www.britishpathe.com/video/small-pox-in-germany/query/Smallpox. 
447. Edward A. Belongia & Allison L. Naleway, Smallpox Vaccine: The Good, the Bad, 
and the Ugly, 1 CLINICAL MEDICINE & RESEARCH 87, 88 (2003). 
448. Id. 
449. WILLIAM CHARNEY, EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND THE THREAT TO OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 
IN THE U.S. AND CANADA 242 (2006) (“When the Bush administration announced 
support for mass vaccinations, WHO did not change its position, but the 
CDC . . . decided to acquiesce . . . . Despite efforts to avoid vaccination of those 
who might be at elevated risk, the CDC reported that there were 145 serious 
adverse events . . . . Of these cases, at least three were deaths.”); see also Bozette 
et al., supra note 50, at 419 (confirming that ten simultaneous attacks at airports 
waged by skilled bioterrorists is one of the only scenarios that would produce 
enough risk to outweigh the dangers of vaccine). 
450. Flight, supra note 352 (“Although mass vaccination calmed fears, it was not always 
the most medically efficient way to combat the disease. Henderson and his team 
developed a strategy of containment and surveillance. Every time there was an 
outbreak, a WHO team would arrive, vaccinate and isolate those who were ill and 
trace and vaccinate all their contacts. Effectively they ring-fenced the disease until 
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c. Could the United States have gotten more vaccine sooner? 
In 1972, Marshal Tito had eighteen million people vaccinated in about 
two weeks, obtaining the vaccine he needed from other sources: he had 
one million doses on hand; the WHO supplied an additional half million.451 
But from where did Tito get the remaining 16.5 million doses so quickly? 
The answer: China, Switzerland, the United States, the U.S.S.R., the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Albania, Bulgaria, France, Greece, the Netherlands, West 
Germany, East Germany and Switzerland.452 If Tito could do this, isn’t it 
likely the United States could tap other governmental sources as well?453 It 
appears that none of the DW conference organizers or participants 
considered this. 
To be sure, there are likely fewer available doses stockpiled around the 
world today, but collecting vaccine from other countries would be a start in 
the event of a smallpox outbreak, a possibility DW does not consider. And 
If O’Dwyer was able to convince seven vaccine manufactures to produce six 
million doses in 1947, one is hard pressed to believe we would be unable to 
duplicate that feat today. 
d. Is vaccine dilution feasible? 
Some months after the hysteria of DW died down and after the 
government had already contracted for vaccine production, research 
concretely established that the smallpox vaccine can be effectively 
diluted.454 Even operating under DW’s erroneous assumption that there 
were only twelve million doses available at the time of the exercise, the 
vaccine could have been diluted enough to serve the American population. 
Using a five-to-one dilution factor means that seventy-five million doses 
would have been immediately available, which is more than necessary for 
ring vaccination; at a ten-to-one dilution factor, there would have been 
enough vaccine for two-thirds of all eligible individuals. 
 
it had no way of moving on to its next victim.”); see also Henderson, supra note 
149. 
451. Stanley M. Aronson & Lucille Newman, Smallpox in the Americas 1492-1815: 
Contagion and Controversy, BROWN UNIV. NEWS SERV. (Dec. 12, 2002), 
http://www.brown.edu/Administration/News_Bureau/2002-03/02-017t.html. 
452. Lane, supra note 346, at Appendix (showing 500,000 doses came from WHO, 3 
million from the USSR, 3.25 million form the USA, 2.3 million from Switzerland, 3.5 
million from China, and several million more doses from the other countries). See 
infra Appendix. 
453. Smallpox Vaccines, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/smallpox/vaccines/en/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2017) 
(stating that there is a stockpile of about thirty-one million doses available 
worldwide that can be obtained on an emergency basis). 
454. See generally Marlene Cimons, US Dilutes Smallpox Vaccine Supplies, 7 NATURE 
MED. 1265 (2001). 
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Even more significantly, data supporting the viability of dilution were 
available before the exercise.455 For example, in 1962, in the wake of the 
Bradford incident, all university students in Britain were offered 
vaccination, but there was not enough vaccine to inoculate everyone and, 
thirty-three percent of the students had never been vaccinated.456 To solve 
this problem, the vaccine was successfully diluted on a 1:30 basis,457 leading 
health officials to conclude that “a titer of 1:30 can be used effectively in an 
emergency.”458 Assuming that only fifteen million doses were available, 
titering by 1:30 would have furnished 450 million doses, enough for one-
and-a-half times the American populace. 
That O’Toole blames the hysteria on the roiling waters of vaccine 
insufficiency is problematic, worrisome and costly—costing over two billion 
dollars. Even when 500,000 doses were made available to first responders, 
the vaccines went unused because health professionals did not want to be 
inoculated. Fewer than eight percent of CDC eligible personnel 
participated,459 asserting that the vaccine involved too many adverse 
events.460 
L. Who makes decisions on the data to use? 
A mass-casualty smallpox epidemic is unlikely in modern America. 
However, there is still some debate about whether bioweapons pose a 
threat—and if so, how much. Some academics believe that the threat is 
inevitable, while others “pose questions about the realistic capabilities of 
terrorists and if bioweapons truly fit their organizational goals.”461 Those 
who believe that a bioterrorist threat is unlikely “emphasize the technical 
barriers that prevent bioterrorism from being used as successfully as bombs 
and other traditional tactics.”462 However this may be “a question better 
answered by the Central Intelligence Agency, and not epidemiologists.”463 
 
455. See Douglas & Edgar, supra note 248, at 614. 
456. Vaccination in a University, supra note 114, at 614.  
457. Id. 
458. Id; see also Douglas & Edgar, supra note 248, at 614.  
459. See CHARNEY, supra note 449, at 242 (“The vaccination campaign did not proceed 
as planned. Opposition arose on both safety and political grounds.”). 
460. CDC Vaccine Acceptances, CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (on file with author). 
461. Saskia Popescu, Capabilities Analysis of Bioterrorism: Roadblocks Facing Non-




463. Enserink, supra note 85, at 1593. 
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Conclusion 
In summary, the goal should be that once an outbreak begins, policy 
questions can be answered using real-time modeling, 
not just ‘most likely’ or ‘worst case’ scenario modeling results are 
communicated but that a more detailed understanding of the 
sensitivity of predictions of predictions of outbreak size and policy 
optimality to model assumptions is conveyed, together with open 
acknowledgement of model or data weakness. Once an outbreak has 
begun, such questions may also be answered more precisely through 
the use of real-time modeling to refine parameters and better inform 
policy.464 
Many experts believe that “bioterrorism preparedness programs have 
been a disaster for public health.”465 Currently, most epidemics from all 
agents are modeled identically, without regard to individual microbiological 
parameters for different agents, including both physical requirements and 
biological propensities, such as growth rate, survival, particle size, and 
transmission characteristics, which are species-dependent, and extrinsic 
factors such as weather conditions, public health capacity, and population 
health. In other words, biological and physical constraints are not 
incorporated into the models. Further, the worst-case-scenario model 
often used for pandemic planning is a mathematical construct that bears no 
relation to reality or to relevant epidemic history. 
Models generating cataclysmic projections rely on seriously skewed 
and artificially manipulated data.466 The lure of personal gain for 
manipulating the data is huge, both financially and academically. 
Institutional bias also plays a role in determining policy. Federal spending 
on biodefense has increased and “the Department of Defense is currently 
at the center of initiatives to enhance federal capabilities to respond to 
biological terrorist threats.”467 
Even where the modelers have no personal or institutional interest, 
choosing correct data is fraught with uncertainty. In the words of the head 
of the Department of Mathematical Biology at Imperial College, “[g]iven the 
many such uncertainties . . . no model can be truly predictive in the context 
of smallpox outbreak planning, and no one control method can be identified 
 
464. Ferguson, supra note 91, at 685. 
465. CHARNEY, supra note 449, at 245 (citation omitted). 
466. It is not surprising, therefore, to find one consultant, the Chief Executive Officer 
of a risk assessment company working with both the DOD and the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, stating that he “think[s] the chance is about eighty percent of 
terrorists obtaining smallpox.” He asserts that “experts” think that “the potential 
for a serious smallpox attack is frighteningly feasible.” Mary Jacoby, Terrorist 
expert cites smallpox risk, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at 3. 
467. Ajayi, supra note 52. 
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a priori as best.”468 Ferguson argues that, while the usefulness of models for 
precise prediction is limited, they should have a role in planning, assuming 
the modelers work with actual, regularly updated data, and relate the math 
to the experiences of the population.469 And “for models to have a 
meaningful role in influencing policy decisions,” it is critical that 
policymakers communicate “not just ‘most likely’ or ‘worst case’ scenario 
modelling [sic] results,” but also a “detailed understanding of the sensitivity 
of predictions of outbreak size and policy optimality to model 
assumptions . . . together with open acknowledgement of model or data 
weakness.”470 
While the usefulness of models for precise prediction is limited, models 
should have a role in planning, provided they work with real, up-to-date, 
and regularly updated data, and relate the math to the experiences of the 
population.471 Projections that grotesquely overestimate the incidence and 
severity of a potential epidemic also generate a climate of fear and 
suspicion regarding the government’s ability to accurately predict and 
prepare for bioweapon attacks, diverting resources from necessary but less 
glamorous quotidian public-health concerns.472 Research on prevalent, 
serious diseases is neglected as a result; for example, research on infectious 
diarrhea, which claims two million lives each year, is underfunded.473 
It appears that to obtain precise or reliable information, we must wait 
until an epidemic begins. Contrary to many fears, this is not a tragedy. 
Smallpox’s reputation as catastrophic “seems unwarranted under modern 
conditions.”474 In reality, experts have said that “it has appeared as a 
plodding nuisance with more bark than bite.”475 A smallpox outbreak 
“would offer, regardless of precautions, fewer biological and administrative 
challenges to local workers than will . . . diseases such as polio or 
diphtheria.”476 An outbreak, even one as severe as the one envisioned by 
the DW gods, could have been, and could still be, more safely addressed. 
 
468. Ferguson, supra note 91, at 685. 
469. Id. 
470. Id. at 685. 
471. Ferguson, supra note 91, at 685. 
472. See, e.g., Warning Over US Smallpox Strategy, BBC (Feb. 26, 2003), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/2801401.stm (expressing a fear that in the 
future, because doctors in the United States are so busy vaccinating people 
against smallpox, they might not notice an actual outbreak). 
473. Jeff Donn, Qualms grow as bioterrorism research funding increases, ST. AUGUSTINE 
REC. (Jan. 28, 2002), 
http://staugustine.com/stories/012802/new_462805.shtml#.WMYl5G8rLIU. 
474. Mack, supra note 170, at 161. 
475. Id. at 169. 
476. Id. 
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Appendix 






People’s Republic of China 3,500,000 
West Germany 125,000 









Figure 3. A statistical compilation of data from post-WWII epidemics. The last column is 





477. Lane, supra note 346, at Appendix. 
478. Data compiled from actual statistics of post-WWII epidemics compared to the       
forecasted (projected data) of the Dark Winter Exercise.  
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479. Figure 2: U.S. Government Funding for Emerging Infectious Disease, FY 2012 – FY 
2015, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/8514-03-figure-
2.png. 
